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CHAPTER 6
Adherence and Enforcement
6.1 ADHERENCE TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

N

ations adhere to the law ofanned conflict not only because they are legally
l
obliged to do so but for the very practical reason that it is in their best
interest to be governed by consistent and mutually acceptable rules of conduct. 2
The law of anned conflict is effective to the extent that it is obeyed. Occasional
violations do not substantially affect the validity ofa rule oflaw, provided routine
compliance, observance, and enforcement continue to be the nonn. However,
repeated violations not responded to by protests, reprisals, or other enforcement
actions may, over time, indicate that a particular rule is no longer regarded as
valid.

1. Under Conunon article 1, each nation has an affinnative duty at all times not only to respect
the requirements ofthe 1949 Geneva Conventions, but also to ensure respect for them by its armed
forces. Nicaragua Military Adivities Case, 1986 I.CJ. 114; 25 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1073 (para. 220)
(holding this duty is a general principle of international law). Further, under GWS 1929, arts.
28-30, & 49-54; GWS-Sea, arts. 50-53; GPW, arts. 129-132; GC, arts. 146-149 (and GP I, arts.
85-87, for nations bound thereby-see Table A5-1 (p. 315)), every such nation has an obligation to
seek out and cause to be prosecuted violators of the Geneva Conventions irrespective of their
nationality, and to otherwise encourage compliance ofthe Conventions by any other country or its
armed forces including those ofits allies. The United States supports the principle, detailed in GP I,
arts. 85-89, that the appropriate authorities take all reasonable measures to prevent acts contrary to
the applicable rules of humanitarian law. The Sixth Annual American Red· Cross-Washington
College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary
International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U J.
Int'l L. & Policy 428 (1987) (remarks of U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser
Matheson). This self-interest is reflected in the following:
Any govenunent which, while not itselfinvolved in a conflict, is in a position to exert
a deterrent influence on a govenunent violating the laws of war, but refrains from
doing so, shares the responsibility for the breaches. By fulling to react while able to do
so, it fosters the process which could lead to its becoming the victim of similar
breaches and no longer an accessory by omission.
ICRC Appeal, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 33 & 289-90.
As ofl November 1997, only Eritrea, the Marshall Islands and Nauru of the 185 U.N. members

were not party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Table AS-l (p. 315).
2. Discipline in combat is essential. Violations of the law of armed conflict detract from the
commander's ability to accomplish his mission. Violations of that law also have an adverse impact
on national and world public opinion. Violations on occasion have served to prolong a conflict by
inciting an opponent to continue resistance.
(continued...)
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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6.1.1 Adherence by the United States. The Constitution of the United
States provides that treaties to which the U.S is a party constitute a part of the
"supreme law of the land" with a force equal to that of law enacted by the
Congress. 3 Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently
ruled that where there is no treaty and no controlling executive, legislative, or
judicial precedent to the contrary, customary international law is a fundamental
element of U.S. nationallaw. 4 Since the law of armed conflict is based on
international agreements to which the U.S. is a party and customary law, it is
binding upon the United States, its citizens, and its armed forces. 5
6.1.2 Department of the Navy Policy. SECNAVINST 3300.1A states that
the Department of the Navy will comply with the law of armed conflict in the
conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflicts. 6 Article
0705, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, provides that:
2.(... continued)
Violations of commitments under the law of anned conflict can seriously hamper the willingness
and political ability of allies to support military activities within and outside the alliance. This is
particularly true of the United States and other nations with democratic forms of government. In
contrast, dictatorships, depending primarily on the deployment of military forces, with total
control ofinternal mass media and allowing no political dissent, may disregard legal commitments
without equivalent impact on their overall political and strategic position. Our posture is
strengthened by our continued respect for the law of anned conflict, while theirs may be
strengthened in some cases by their willingness to disregard those laws for temporary tactical
advantage. Therefore, an opponent's disregard of the law is not a sound basis for the United States
to take a similar callous attitude. Rather, the sharper the distinction between our respect for the
sensitivities and individuality ofour allies, supported by our respect for the law, and our opponent's
disregard of the interests of their allies and the law, the better for our overall posture. Compliance
will also assure the U.S. of the moral high ground, maintain and enhance support from our allies,
and foster sympathy for our cause among neutrals. In short, U.S. anned forces are committed to
combat to protect fundamental values, not to abandon them.
Accordingly, violations of the law by U.S. anned forces may have greater impact on American and
world public opinion than would similar violations by our adversaries. See AFP 110-31, para. 1-6;
Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers 227 (5th ed. 1986).
3. U.S. Const., art. VI, d. 2.
4. E.g., The Paquete Rahana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct. 290, 299 (1900); Reidv. Covert, 354 U.S.
1,18,77 S.Ct. 1222, 1231 (1957). See also 1 Restatement (Third), sec. 111, Reporters' Notes 2 &
3, and Introductory Note.
5. The law ofanned conflict is part ofU .S.law which every servicemember has taken an oath
to obey. This obligation is implemented for the armed forces in DOD Directive 5100.77, Subj:
DOD Law of War Program, and the Unifonn Code of Military Justice.
6. SECNAVINST 3300.1 (series), Subj: Law of Anned Conflict (Law of War) Program to
Insure Compliance by the Naval Establishment, para. 4a. Similar directions have been
promulgated by the operational chain of command, e.g., MJCS 0124-88, 4 August 1988, Subj:
Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program; USCINCLANTINST 3300.3 (series), Subj:
DOD Law ofWar Instruction; CINCPACFLTINST 3300.9 (series), Subj: Implementation ofthe
DOD Law of War Program.
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At all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commal!ds to observe, the principles
of international law. Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a departure from other
provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized?

It is the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps (see OPNAVINST 3300.52 and MCO 3300.3) to ensure
that:
1. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps observe and enforce the law of anned
conflict at all times. International anned conflicts are governed by the law of
anned conflict as a matter oflaw. However, not all situations are "international"
anned conflicts. In those circumstances when international anned conflict does
not exist (e.g. internal anned conflicts), law of anned conflict principles may
nevertheless be applied as a matter ofpolicy.8

2. Alleged violations of the law of anned conflict, whether committed by or
against United States or enemy personnel, are promptly reported, thoroughly
investigated, and where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. 9
7. Other arts. of U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, concerned with international law and with
international relations in armed conflict, include:

Article
Title
0406(5)
Designation of Hospital Ships and Medical Aircraft
0829
Prisoners of War
0854
Hospital Ship or Medical Aircraft
0912
Communication with Foreign Officials
0914
Violations ofInternational Law and Treaties
0920
Protection of Commerce of the United States
0924
Medical or Dental Aid to Persons Not in the Naval Service
0925
Assistance to Persons, Ships and Aircraft in Distress
0939
Granting of Asylum and Temporary Refuge
1063
Detail of Persons Performing Medical or Religious Services
1135
Relations with Foreign Nations
8. Para. 3a ofthe draft revision ofDOD Directive 5100.77 (paragraph 6.1.1, note 5 (p. 324»
provides:
3. The Heads of the DOD Components shall:
a. Ensure that the armed forces of the United States will comply with the law of
war during armed conflict however such conflicts are characterized and with the
principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.
9. Essential, therefore, is reporting of the facts by all persons with knowledge of suspected
violations up the chain ofcommand to the NCA. In the Department ofthe Navy, SECNAVINST
3300.1 (series) requires the reporting of all suspected violations of the law of armed conflict. See
Annex A6-1 (p. 359), replicating enclosure (2) to SECNAVINST 3300.1 (series), for an
illustrative list of reportable violations. Arts. 87(1) and (3) ofGP I require State parties to require
military commanders at all levels to report to competent authorities breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and GP I by or against members ofthe armed forces under their command and other
(continued...)

326

Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

3. All service members of the Department of the Navy, commensurate with their
duties and responsibilities, receive, through publications, instructions, training
10
programs and exercises, training and education in the law of armed conflict.

Navy and Marine Corps judge advocates responsible for advising operational
commanders are specially trained to provide officers in command with advice
and assistance in the law of armed conflict on an independent and expeditious
basis. The Chiefof Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
have directed officers in command of the operating forces to ensure that their

9.{... continued)
persons under their control, to take the necessary steps to prevent violations, and where
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary "or penal" action against the violators. The United States
supports this principle as one that should be observed and in due course recognized as customary
law. Matheson, Remarks, paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323), at 422 & 428.
10. SECNAVINST 3300.1 (series), para. 4b. OPNAVINST 3300.52, Subj: Law of Armed
Conflict (Law of War) Program to Ensure Compliance by the U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve; and
MCO 3300.3, Subj: Marine Corps Law ofWar Program, define, respectively, the U.S. Navy and
U.S. Marine Corps law of anned conflict training programs. Annex A6-2 (p. 362) provides the
fundamental rules for combatants, suitable for a basic training program.
The law of anned conflict has long recognized that knowledge of the requirements of the law is a
prerequisite to compliance with the law and to prevention of violations of its rules, and has
therefore required training of the anned forces in this body of law. On dissemination, see Hague
IV, art. 1; Hague X, art. 20; GWS 1929, art. 29; GWS, art 47; GWS-Sea, art. 48; GPW, art. 127;
GC, art. 144; and for States party thereto, the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property, arts.
7 & 25; GP I, arts. 83 & 87(2); GP II, art. 19; and the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention,
art. 6. The United States supports the principle in GP I, art. 83, that study of the principles of the
law of anned conflict be included in programs of military instruction. Matheson, Remarks,
paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323), at 428. See also Meyrowitz, The Function of the Laws of War in
Peacetime, 1986 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 77; Hampson, Fighting by the Rules: Instructing the
Armed Forces in Humanitarian Law, 1989 id. 111; Green, The Man in the Field and the Maxim
IgnorantiaJuris Non Excusat, in Essays on the Modern Law of War 27 (1985). On legal advisers in
anned forces, see GP I, art. 82; Parks, The Law of War Adviser, 31 JAG J. 1 (1980); Green, The
Role of Legal Advisers in the Anned Forces, in Essays on the Modern Law ofWar 73 (1985). The
United States supports the principle of art. 82, that legal advisers be made available, when
necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of these
principles. Matheson, id., at 428.JAGINST 3300.1 (series), note 11 (p. 327), details the operational
law billets identified for U.S. Navy judge advocates. On the duty ofcommanders, see GP I, art. 87.
The manner of achieving these results is left to nations to implement. Various international bodies
exist to assist, e.g., the ICRC, Henry Dunant Institute in Geneva Switzerland, International
Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo Italy, the International Society of Military Law and
the Law of War, and the International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacy. See de
Mullinen, Law ofWar Training Within Armed Forces: Twenty Years Experience, 1987 Int'l Rev.
Red Cross 168. On the role of military manuals (such as this publication) in the dissemination of
the law of anned conflict to military forces, see Reisman & Lietzau, Moving International Law
from Theory to Practice: The Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed
Conflict, in Robertson at 1-7.
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judge advocates have appropriate clearances and access to infonnation to enable
th em to carry out th at responSl·bili·ty. 11
6.1.3 Command Responsibility. Officers in command are not only
responsible for ensuring that they conduct all combat operations in accordance
with the law of armed conflict; they are also responsible for the proper
performance of their subordinates. While a commander may delegate some or all
of his authori!)T, he cannot delegate responsibility for the conduct of the forces he
commands. 12 The fact that a commander did not order, authorize, or knowingly
acquiesce in a violation of the law of armed conflict by a subordinate will not
relieve him of responsibility for its occurrence ifit is established that he failed to
exercise properly his command authority or failed otherwise to take reasonable
. 1·
measures to discover an d correct VlO
atlons th at may occur. 13
11. OPNAVINST 3300.52, para. 4.k.2. See JAGINST 3300.1 (series), Subj: JAG Billets
Requiring Special or Detailed Knowledge of the Law ofArmed Conflict and Training Objectives
for Navy Judge Advocates in Such Billets; and JAGINST 3300.2 (series), Subj: Law of Armed
Conflict Resource Materials. The Army Judge Advocate General's School has developed a
checklist for the review of operational plans to ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict,
which is set forth in chap. 6 of the School's Operational Law Handbook.
12. U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 0802.1.
13. A commander at any level is personally responsible for the crilninal acts of warfare
committed by a subordinate if the commander knew in advance of the breach about to be
committed and had the ability to prevent it, but failed to take the appropriate action to do so. In
determining the personal responsibility of the commander, the element of knowledge may be
presumed if the commander had information which should have enabled him or her to conclude
under the circumstances that such breach was to be expected. Officers in command are also
personally responsible for unlawful acts of warfare performed by subordinates when such acts are
committed by order, authorization, or acquiescence of a superior. Those facts will each be
determined objectively. See Green, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Command
Responsibility, Nav. War ColI. Rev., Spring 1997, 26-68; Levie, Command
Responsibility, 8 USAFAJ. Leg. Stu. _ (1998) (forthcolning).
Some lnilitary tribunals have held that, in suitable circumstances, the responsibility ofcommanding
officers may be based upon the failure to acquire knowledge of the unlawful conduct of
subordinates. In TIle Hostages Case, the United States Military Tribunal stated:
Want of knowledge of the contents ofreports made to him [i.e., to the commanding
general] is not a defense. Reports to commanding generals are made for their special
benefit. Any failure to acquaint themselves with the contents of such reports, or a
failure to require additional reports where inadequacy appears on their face,
constitutes a dereliction of duty which he cannot use in his own behal£

United States v. Wilhelm List et al., 9 TWC 127 (1950).
The responsibility of commanding officers for unlawful conduct of subordinates has not been
applied to isolated offenses against the laws of armed conflict, but only to offenses of considerable
magnitude and duration. Even in the latter instances, the circumstances surrounding the
comlnission of the unlawful acts have been given careful consideration:
(continued...)
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6.1.4 Individual Responsibility. All members of the naval service have a duty
to comply with the law of armed conflict and, to the utmost of their ability and
authority, to prevent violations by others. 14 They also have an affirmative
13.(... continued)
It is absurd ... to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one ofhis
soldiers commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape and
vicious, revengeful actions are wide-spread offences, and there is no effective
attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a
commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawlessness ofhis
troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them.

Trial

of General Tomoyuki Yamashita,

4 LRTWC 35 (t948).

The responsibility of a commanding officer may be based solely upon inaction. Depending upon
the circumstances ofthe case, it is not always necessary to prove that a superior actually knew ofthe
offense committed by his subordinates ifit can be established that available information was such
that he or she should have known. (GP I, art. 86, Failure to Act, confirms this rule.) See Parks,
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Green, Essays on the Modem
Law of War 225-37 (1985). See also Levie, at 421-9 for a general discussion of command
responsibility, and at 156-63 for an analysis of the Yamashita trial. The Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, reprinted in
32 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1192 (1993) [hereinafter "Statute of the International Tribunal for
Yugoslavia"], art. 7, establishes individual criminal responsibility for "a person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or
execution" of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the laws or customs of war,
genocide or crimes against humanity. Art. 7(3) specifically provides:
3. The fact that any of the acts ..... was committed by a subordinate does not relieve
his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereo£
The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994, reprinted in 33 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1598 (1994) [hereinafter "Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda"] contains essentially identical language at art. 6(3).
The Statute of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were adopted by the U.N. Security Council in U.N.S.C.
Resolutions 827 (1993) (reprinted in 32 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1203 (1993» and 955 (1994) (reprinted in 33
Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1598 (1994», respectively.
14. Where U.S. personnel are involved, military personnel with supervisory authority have a
duty to prevent criminal acts. Any person in the naval service who sees a criminal act about to be
committed must act to prevent it to the utmost of his or her ability and to the extent ofhis or her
authority. 10 U.S. Code sec. 5947; U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990, arts. 1131 & 1137. Possible
actions include moral arguments to dissuade, threatening to report the criminal act, repeating
orders of superiors, stating personal disagreement, and asking the senior individual on scene to
intervene as a means of preventing the criminal act. In the event the criminal act direcdy and
imminendy endangers a person's life (including the life ofanother person lawfully under his or her
(continued ...)
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obligation to report prompdy violations ofwhich they become aware. Members
of the naval service, like military members of all nations, must obey readily and
stricdy all lawful orders issued by a superior. 15 Under both international law and
U.S. law, an order16 to commit an obviously criminal act, such as the wanton
killing of a noncombatant or the torture of a prisoner, is an unlawful order and
will not relieve a subordinate of his responsibility to comply with the law of
armed conflict. Only if the unlawfulness of an order is not known by the
individual, and he could not reasonably be expected under the circumstances to
recognize the order as unlawful, will the defense ofobedience to an order protect
a subordinate from the consequences ofviolation ofthe law ofarmed conflict. 17

6.2 ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Various means are available to belligerents under international law for
inducing compliance with the law of armed conflict. To establish the facts, the
belligerents may agree to an ad hoc inquiry. 18 In the event of a clearly established
violation of the law of armed conflict, the aggrieved nation may: 19
14.(... continued)
custody), force may be used to the extent necessary to prevent the crime. However, the use of
deadly force is rarely justified; it may be used only to protect life and only under conditions of
extreme necessity as a last resort when lesser means are clearly inadequate to protect life. Compare
SECNAVINST 5500.29 (series), Subj: Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by
Personnel ofthe Department ofthe Navy in Conjunction with Law Enforcement, Security Duties,
and Personal Protection; OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), Subj: Standard Organization and
Regulations of the U.S. Navy, art. 412b, circumstances under which a weapon may be fired; and
OPNAVINST C5510.83 (series), Subj: Navy Nuclear Weapons Security Manual.
15. U. S. Navy Regulations, 1990, art. 1132 and UCMj, arts. 90-92, delineate offenses
involving disobedience oflawful orders. Both SECNAVINST 3300.1 (series) and OPNAVINST
3300.52 (see paragraph 6.1.2, note 11 (p. 327» are drafted as lawful general orders. See paragraph
6.2.5.5.1 (p.355).
16. The order may be direct or indirect, explicit or implied.
17. See paragraph 6.2.5.5.1 (p. 355) for a further discussion of the defense of superior orders.
War crimes trials are discussed in paragraphs 6.2.5.1 (p. 350) and 6.2.5.2 (p. 351).
18. The Geneva Conventions have long authorized and encouraged belligerents to agree to
objective enquiries into alleged violations ofthose Conventions. GWS 1929, art. 30; GWS, art. 52;
GWS-Sea, art. 53; GPW, art. 132; GC, art. 149. (See paragraph 6.1.2 (p. 324) regarding national
requirements to investigate alleged violations of the law of armed conflict.) No such ad hoc
agreement has ever been concluded, in large measure because ofmutual suspicions and hostilities.
The United Nations has established a team ofexperts to investigate allegations ofsuch violations. See,
e.g., Prisoners ofWar in Iran and Iraq: The Report ofa Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General,
january 1985, U.N. Doc. S/16962, 22 Feb. 1985; and Report of Group of Experts to Investigate
Reports of the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, U.N. Doc. S/19823, 25 Apr. 1988, which led to
vigorous condemnation of their use, albeit without assigning responsibility to one side, in Security
Council Resolution 612,9 May 1988, Dep'tSt. Bull.,july 1988, at 69. See also U.N. GeneralAssembly
Resolution 46/59 (1991), Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the
Maintenance ofIntemational Peace and Security, 31 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 235 (1992).
(continued...)
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1. Publicize the facts with a view toward influencing world public opinion against
a:: di
. 20
th e Ollen
ng natIon
18.(... continued)
An International Fact-Finding Commission has been established under GP I, article 90. See 1991
Int'l Rev. Red Cross 208-09, 411-12. By 15 October 1997, 50 nations had accepted the
competence of the Commission, including the European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden and
Switzerland), and ten NATO countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain), Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Australia and New
Zealand. The Commission cannot act without the consent of the parties to the dispute, which can
be given either on a permanent one-time basis or an ad hoc basis for a particular dispute. The
members of the Commission, elected in mid-March 1992, may be found in ICRC Bulletin, April
1992, at 4. The fact that the former-Soviet Union (prior to its acceptance of the Commission's
competence on 29 September 1989), and its allies and clients, were most reluctant to permit
third-party supervision of the Geneva Conventions was another factorin the United States' refusal
to seek ratification ofGP I. Sofaer, Remarks, 2 Am. UJ. Int'l L. & Policy 470.
Belligerents not party to GP I, or States party to GP I which have not accepted the competence of
the Fact Finding Commission, may request the Commission to investigate allegations of grave
breaches or serious violations of the Convention. Bothe, Partsch & Solf at 543-44; Krill, The
International Fact-Finding Commission-The Role of the ICRC, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross
190, at 197; Roach, The International Fact-Finding Commission, id. at 176. See also Kalshoven,
Noncombatant Persons, in Robertson at 306-07.
19. See Sachariew, States' Entitlement to Take Action to Enforce International Humanitarian
Law, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 177.
Commanders are not usually required to make the policy decision as to the appropriate use of one
or more of the remedial actions set forth in the text, although there are exceptional situations in
which even junior commanders may be required to make protests and demands addressed directly
to the commander of offending forces. It is also apparent that a government decision cannot be
made intelligently unless all officers upon whom the responsibility for decision rests understand the
available remedial actions and report promptly to higher authority those circumstances which may
justify their use.
20. Experience in the Southeast Asia conflict amply demonstrates the particular effectiveness
of television in affecting knowledge of and popular (home) support for U.S. forces. Summers,
Western Media and Recent Wars, Mil. Rev., May 1986, at 4; Mitchell, Television and the
Vietnam War, Nav. WarColl. Rev., May-June 1984, at42; Rinaldo, The Tenth Principle ofWar:
Information, Mil. Rev., Oct. 1987, at 55; Walker, Truth is the Best Propaganda: A Study in
Military Psychological Operations, National Guard Mag., Oct. 1987, at 26; Paddock,
Psychological Operations, Special Operations, and US Strategy, in Special Operations in US
Strategy 229 (Barnett, Tovar & Shultz eds. 1984). For the role of the media during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, see Shell, A Portrait of Pentagon's Media Strategy, Public
RelationsJ.,June 1991, at 9-11; Zoglin, It Was a Public Relations Rout, Too, Time, March 11,
1991, at 56-57; Holland, Put the Brass on the Tube, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., April 1991, at 48;
Watson, The Issue of Media Access to Information, in Military Lessons of the Gulf War 202-11
(1991); Smith, How CNN Fought the War (1991); Arnett, Live From Baghdad (1992).
During Iraq's unlawful occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council invited all States to "collate
substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq ...
and to make this information available to the Council." U.N.S.C. Res. 674, 29 Oct. 1990, reprinted
in U.S. Dep't of State, Dispatch, 5 Nov. 1990, at 239-40. For a report submitted by the U.S.
pursuant to Resolution 674, see U.N. Doc. S121987, 7 Dec. 1990 (USA). See also U.N. Docs.
S122535 and S122536, 29 April 1991 (reports of the Secretary-General).
(continued ...)
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2. Protest to the offending nation and demand that those responsible be punished
21
and/or that compensation be paid
20.(...continued)
Additionally, private individuals and nongovernmental organizations can be expected to attempt
to ascertain and publicize the facts pertaining to alleged violations of the Conventions. Other
organizations that have provided supervision of the application of the law of armed conflict
include, among others, Amnesty International, Commission Medico-Juridique de Monaco,
Human Rights Watch, ICRC, International Commission ofJurists, International Committee of
Military Medicine and Pharmacy, International Law Association and the World Veterans
Federation. All ofthese organizations have been effective in bringing private and public pressure to
bear on governments regarding the conduct of their armed forces in armed conflicts.
21. Such protest and demand for punishment may be communicated directly to an offending
belligerent or to the commander of the offending forces. On the other hand, an offended
belligerent may choose to forward its complaints through a Protecting Power, a humanitarian
organization acting in the capacity of a Protecting Power, or any nation not participating in the
armed conflict.
Hague IV, art. 3, states:
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said [Hague] Regulations
shall, ifthe case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all
acts committed by persons forming part ofits armed forces.

See Affaire des Biens Britannique au Maroc Espagnol (Spain v. U.S.), Report III (Oct. 23, 1924), at 2
UNRIAA 645 (1949) and Kalshoven, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces,
40 I.C.L.Q. 827 (1991). It is now generally established that the principle laid down in art. 3 is
applicable to the violation of any rule regulating the conduct of hostilities and not merely to
violations of the Hague Regulations. See Sandoz, Unlawful Damage in Armed Conflicts and
Redress Under International Humanitarian Law, 1982 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 131,136-137. This
customary rule is repeated in GP I, art. 91, and is discussed in useful detail in ICRC, Commentary
1053-58. For an excellent discussion ofState responsibility and reparations for violations ofthe law
of armed conflict pertaining to environmental damage, see Greenwood, State Responsibility and
Civil Liability for Environmental Damage Caused by Military Operations, in Grunawalt, King &
McClain at 397-415; and Green, State Responsibility and Civil Reparation for Environmental
Damage, in id. at 416-39.
Recent demands for compensation involving U.S. forces include the following:
Iraq agreed to give compensation for "the loss of life, personal injuries and. material
damages" resulting from the attack on USS STARK on 17 May 1987. Exchange of Notes, 20 & 21
May 1987, 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1427-28 (1987). Detailed claims for the wrongful deaths were
submitted to Iraq in April 1988, Dep't St. Bull., Oct. 1988, at 59; Iraq paid $27.3 million, Dep't St.
Bull., May 1989, at 67; 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 644, 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 561 (1989).
For almost two hours on 8 June 1967, Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats attacked USS
LffiERTY (AGTR-5) on the high seas of the Mediterranean about 15 NM west ofthe Gazasttip,
just as Israel was concluding the Six-Day War. On 27 May 1968, Israel paid the United States
$3,323,500, the full amount ofcompensation claimed on behalfof the 34 U.S. Navy men killed in
the attack. Dep't St. Bull., 17 June 1968, at 799. On 28 April 1969, Israel paid $3,566,457 in
settlement of the United States' claims on behalf of the additional 171 U.S. Navy members
wounded in the attack. Dep'tSt.Bull., 2June 1969, at 473. On 17 December 1980, Israel agreed to
pay $6 million, in three installments, for its damages to LffiERTY (albeit without conceding
liability). 32 U.S.T. 4434, T.I.A.S. 9957; 1980 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law
747-48. The factual and legal issues of the attack are carefully examined in Jacobsen, AJuridical
Examination of the Israeli Attack on the USS Uberty, 36 Nav. L. Rev. 1 (1986).
(continued...)
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3. Seek the intervention of a neutral party, particularly with respect to the
protection of prisoners of war and other of its nationals that have fallen under the
control of the offending nation22

21.(... continued)
On 11 July 1988, the United States offered to compensate ex gratia the families ofthose lost
in the downing ofIranian Airbus flight 655 on 3 July 1988. 24 Weekly Compo Pres. Docs. 912 (18
July 1988). See Friedman, The Vincennes Incident, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., May 1989, at 72-79, and
Agora: The Downing ofIran Air Flight 655,83 Am.]. Int'l L. 318-41 (1989). The ICAO report of
investigation and ICAO Council actions are reproduced in 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 896 (1989). Iran's application
against the United States before the I.CJ. appears at28 id. 842. See also 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 912-13 (1989).
On 25 October 1983, at a time when the People's Revolutionary Army of Grenada was
using a group ofbuildings inside Fort Matthew, St. George's, Grenada, as a military command post
143 feet away from the Richmond Hill Insane Asylum, a bomb from a Navy A-7 aircraft
accidentally struck the Asylum, killing sixteen patients and injuring six. A complaint against the
United States was deemed admissible by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See
Weissbrodt & Andrus, The Right to Life During Armed Conflict: Disabled Peoples' International
V. United States, 29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 59 (1988). The claim was subsequendy withdrawn. While the
U.S. Agency for International Development provided ex gratia compensation to individual victims
and to rebuild the hospital, the U.S. maintained that it had no legal obligation to do so since its
actions were in compliance with the law of armed conflict. Ridlmond HnI V. United States, Case
9213, Report No. 3/96, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser. LlV/11.91 Doc. 7 at 201 (1996). See also
paragraph 8.1.2.1 (p. 404) regarding incidental injury and collateral damage.
See also the Japanese acceptance of responsibility for the 12 December 1937 sinking in the
Yangtze River of the U.S. gunboat USS PANAY by Japanese aircraft (38 U.S. Naval War
College, International Law Situations, with Situations and Notes, 1938, at 129-50 (1940);
Swanson, The Panay Incident: Prelude to Pearl Harbor, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., Dec. 1967, at 26,
and the United States acceptance of responsibility for the sinking on 1 April 1945 of the Japanese
passenger-cargo vessel AWA MARU on a voyage in which she had been given assurances of safe
passage, Agreement and Agreed Terms of Understanding on the Setdement pf Awa Mam Claim,
Tokyo, 14 April 1949, 9 Bevans 467.
During the course of the afternoon of 8 June 1982, near the end of the Falklands/Malvinas
war, the Liberian flag tanker HERCULES, in ballast, was attacked three times by Argentinian
military aircraft about 600 miles east of Argentina and nearly 500 miles from the Falklands in the
South Adantic. The bombing and rocket attacks damaged her decks and hull and lefr one
undetonated bomb lodged in her starboard side. The o' mers decided it was too dangerous to attempt
to remove this bomb and had her scutded 250 NM offthe Brazilian coast. The vessel owner and time
charter sued Argentina in U.S. Federal District Court which held that under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.c. sec. 1330, 1602-1611, the District Court did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. V. Algentine Republic, 638 F.
Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Court ofAppeals reversed, holding that the facts alleged, ifproven,
would constitute clear violations ofintemationallaw (e.g., 1958 High Seas Convention, Hague XIII)
cognizable under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.s.C. sec. 1350, which the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act did not change. 830 F.2d 421, 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1375 (2d Cir. 1987), discussed in
Recent Developments, 28 Va.]. Int'l L. 221 (1988) and Morris, Sovereign Immunity for Military
Activities on the High Seas: Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic, 23 Int'l Lawyer 213 (1989). The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtainingjurisdiction
over a foreign nation in U.S. courts, and the District Court correcdy dismissed the action, 109 S.C.
683,57 U.S.L.W. 4121, 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'is 382 (1989), 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 565 (1989).
(continued...)
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4. Execute a belligerent reprisal action (see paragraph 6.2.3)23

5. Pullish individual offenders either during the conflict or upon cessation of
h os tili··
tles. 24

6.2.1 The Protecting Power. Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the
treatment of prisoners ofwar, interned civilians, and the inhabitants of occupied
territory is to be monitored by a neutral nation known as the Protecting
Power. 25 Due to the difficulty of finding a nation which the opposing
21.(...continued)
In para. 13 of Resolution 669 (1990), the U.N. Security Council reaffinned that Iraq is
"liable under the [Fourth Geneva] Convention in respect ofthe grave breaches committed by it, as
are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches." U.S. Dep't of State
Dispatch, 1 Oct. 1990, at 129. By para. 8 of Resolution 674 (1990), the U.N. Security Council
reminded Iraq of its liability under international law for "any loss, damage or injury arising in
regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion
and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq." Id., 5 Nov. 1990, at 240. See also U.N.S.C. Resolution
687 (1991) reprinted in 30 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 846 (1991), which established a compensation
commission to administer a fund from which claims against Iraq would be paid.
22. See, e.g., Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General on the Situation of
Prisoners of War in the Islamic Republic ofIran and Iraq, U.N. Doc. S/20147, 24 Aug. 1988.
Diplomatic pressure applied through neuttal States or through international organizations has
become a major factor in enforcing the law of armed conflict. During the Southeast Asia conflict,
for example, the United States conducted a successful diplomatic effort through neuttal States to
prevent political "show trials" of our prisoners ofwar. Levie, Maltteattnent of Prisoners ofWar in
Vietnam, 48 Boston U.L. Rev. 323, 344-45 (1968), reprinted in 2 The Vietnam War and
International Law 361, 382-83 (Falk ed. 1969). Accurate, thorough investigation of enemy
violations gready help in pursuing such diplomatic activity. See paragraph 6.2, note 18 (p. 329).
23. See paragraph 6.2.3 (p. 335).
24. See paragraph 6.2.5 (p. 343).
25. GWS, art. 8; GWS-Sea, art. 8; GPW, art. 8, GC, art. 9; GP I, arts. 2(c} & 5; de Preux,
Synopsis I: Protecting Power, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 86. The United States sttongly supports
the principle that Protecting Powers be designated and accepted without delay from the beginning
of any conflict. Matheson, Remarks, paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323), at 428-29. That principle is
contained in GP I, art. 5, but not unequivocally, and is still subject, in the last instance, to refusal by
the nation in question.Id. The United States thus fulled to obtain one ofits "basic objectives" in the
negotiations that produced art. 5. Sofaer, Remarks, paragraph 6.2, note 18 (p. 330), at 469-70.
Prior to its entty into World War II, the United States acted as protecting power for British
prisoners ofwar in Europe. Subsequendy, the Swiss assumed this duty for both the United States
and Great Britain. Since World War II, the protecting power system has not worked well because
some countries refuse to pennit on-site inspection. There was no protecting power for U.S.
prisoners ofwar during the conflicts in Korea, Southeast Asia, or Kuwait/Iraq. In fact, since 1949, a
Protecting Power (Switzerland) was appointed only in the following cases: the Suez conflict in
1956, the Goa conflict in 1961 and the war between India and Pakistan in 1971-1972 (although in
the latter case the mandate of Switzerland was not understood in the same way by both parties).
Hay, The ICRC and International Humanitarian Issues, 1984 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 3,5. During
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, Switzerland and Brazil, although not formally appointed as
Protecting Powers for the United Kingdom and Argentina respectively, exercised functions of an
intermediary and communicated infonnation. Junod, Protection of the Victims of Armed
Conflict, Falkland-Malvinas Islands (1982), at 20 (1984); ICRC, Commentary 77 n.2.
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belligerents will regard as truly neutral, international humanitarian
organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, have been
authorized by the parties to the conflict to perfonn at least some of the functions
26
of a Protecting Power.

6.2.2 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The
ICRC is a private, nongovernmental, humanitarian organization based in
Geneva, Switzerland. The ruling body of the ICRC is comlosed entirely of
2
Swiss citizens and is staffed mainly by Swiss nationals.
(The ICRC is
distinct from and should not be confused with the various national Red Cross
societies such as the American National Red Cross.)28 Its principal pu~ose is
to provide protection and assistance to the victims of anned conflict. 9 The
Geneva Conventions recognize the special status of the ICRC and have
assigned specific tasks for it to perfonn, including visiting and interviewing
prisoners of war,30 providing relief to the civilian population of occupied
26. The Conventions allow the ICRC to perform some duties of the Protecting Power ifsuch
a power cannot be found and ifthe detaining power allows it to so act. GWS, art. 10; GWS-Sea, art.
10; GPW, art. 10; GC, art. 11; GP I, art. 5; see Peirce, Humanitarian Protection for the Victims of
War: The System of Protecting Powers and the Role of the ICRC, 90 Mil. L. Rev. 89 (1980).
In Korea and in Southeast Asia, for example, the ICRC acted in its traditional humanitarian role for
North Korean, Chinese, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners in the hands of the United
States and its allies notwithstanding refusal by North Korea and North Vietnam to provide ICRC
access to prisoners in their hands. Levie, Maltreatment of Prisoners ofWar in Vietnam, 48 Boston
U. L. Rev. 323 (1968), reprinted in Schmitt & Green at chap. V; Levie, 2 Code oflnternational
Armed Conflict 312; The International Committee and the Vietnam Conflict, 1966 Int'l Rev.
Red Cross 399; Activities of the ICRC in Indochina from 1965 to 1972, 1973 Int'l Rev. Red
Cross 27.
The ICRC also visited Iraqi POWs held by Coalition Forces in Saudi Arabia during the GulfWar.
Iraq, however, refused ICRC access to Coalition POWs held in Iraq. ICRC Bulletin, March 1991,
at 2.
27. Given the increase in the number ofsituations in which the ICRC is being called upon to
act, it is becoming common for the ICRC to appoint non-Swiss nationals as post and field officers.
28. Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, arts. 1 & 5 (1986),
reprinted in 1987 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 29, 32. The ICRC bases its activities on the principles of
neutrality and hurnanity, and is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
Some national Red Cross societies are under government control.
29. Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, art. 5(2) (d) (1986),
1987 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 33. See While & Raymer, A Litde Humanity: the International
Committee of the Red Cross, 170 National Geographic, November 1986, at 647-79.
The ICRC's responsibility to endeavor to ensure the protection of victims extends not only to
international and non-international armed conflicts and their direct results, but also to internal strife.
Red Cross Movement Statute, art. 5(2)(d). Art. 5 also tasks the ICRC with a number ofother functions.
30. The ICRC is also authorized to visit and interview detained or interned civilians in
international armed conflicts. All such interviews must be without witnesses present. GPW, art.
126; GC, arts. 30(3), 76(6), 126 & 143(2).
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offerin~ its "good offices" to facilitate the establishment of hospital and safety
zones. 3 Under its governing statute, the ICRC is dedicated to work for the
faithful application of the Geneva Conventions, to endeavor to ensure the
protection of military and civilian victims of armed conflict, and to serve as a
neutral intermediary between belligerents. 34

6.2.3 Reprisal. A reprisal is an enforcement measure under the law of armed
conflict consisting of an act which would otherwise be unlawful but which is
31. GC, arts. 59, 61 & 142.
32. GPW, art. 123, and GC, art. 140; GP I, art. 33, for State parties thereto. The ICRC is also
responsible under these articles for transmitting £unily messages to PWs and interned civilians.
33. GWS, art. 23(3); GC, art. 14(3). The ICRC is also entitled to receive requests for aid from
protected persons (GC art. 30) and to exercise its right ofinitiative (Red Cross Movement Statute,
art. 5(3». The ICRC may ask the parties to a conflict to agree to its discharging other humanitarian
functions in the event of non-international anned conflicts (common article 3) and international
anned conflicts (GWS, art. 9; GWS-Sea, art. 9; GPW, art. 9; GC, art. 10). Hay, paragraph 6.2.1,
note 25 (p. 333) at 6. The ICRC is now also authorized to act in cases ofinternal strife. Red Cross
Movement Statute, art. 5(2)(d).
34. The 1986 Red Cross Movement Statute (art. 5(2)(c» expanded the ICRC's mandate to
include working for the "faithful application ofinternational humanitarian law applicable in anned
conflicts." See Forsythe, Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 12
Human Rights Q. 265 (1990).
The ICRC has defined "international humanitarian law applicable in anned conflicts" as:
[I]nternational rules, established by treaties or custom, which are specifically
intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from international or
noninternational anned conflicts and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right
of parties to a conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of their choice or
protect persons and property that are, or may be, affected by conflict. The expression
"international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts" is often abbreviated
to "international humanitarian law" or "humanitarian law."
1981 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 76.
These rules are derived from the Law ofthe Hague and the Law of Geneva. The Law ofthe Hague
deals principally with weapons and methods of warfare and was codified by the 1899 and 1907
Hague Peace Conferences. The law relating to the protection ofwar victims has been contained in
the various Geneva Conventions (of1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949). The two traditions (Hague and
Geneva) have been somewhat merged in GP I, since Part III ofGP I deals with methods and means
of warfare. As a result, a new tenn, "rules ofinternationallaw applicable in anned conflict," was
introduced by GP I to encompass "the rules applicable in anned conflict set forth in international
agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and the generally recognized principles
and rules ofinternational law applicable in armed conflict" (GP I, art. 2(b». Although this tenn has
substantially the same meaning as the ICRC's terms, the ICRC's role does not extend to
supervision of the conduct of hostilities.
The ICRC has issued the following internal guidelines to govern its activities in the event of
breaches of the law:
(continued ...)
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34.(...continued)
1. Steps taken by the JCRC on its own initiative

General rule: The ICRC shall take all appropriate steps to put an end to violations of
international humanitarian law or to prevent the occurrence ofsuch violations. These
steps may be taken at various levels according to the gravity ofthe breaches involved.
However, they are subject to the following conditions:

Cotifidential dlaracter ofsteps taken: In principle these steps will remain confidential.
Public statements: The ICRC reserves the right to make public statements
concerning violations ofinternational humanitarian law ifthe following conditions
are fulfilled:
- the violations are major and repeated;
- the steps taken confidentially have not succeeded in putting an end to the violations;
- such publicity is in the interest ofthe persons or populations affected or threatened;
- the ICRC delegates have witnessed the violations with their own eyes, or the
existence and extent of those breaches were established by reliable and verifiable
sources ....
1981 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 81-83.
The ICRC made overt representations regarding the Iran-Iraq War. See 1983 Int'l Rev. Red Cross
220-22 (press release of 11 May 1983 describing appeal of7 May 1983 to the nations party to the
Geneva Conventions); 1984 id. 113-15 (press release of 15 Feb. 1984 regarding appeal to
governments of10 Feb. 1984); 1984 id. 357-58 (press release describing appeal to governments of
24 Nov. 1984). The ICRC issued a press release regarding misuse of the Red Cross emblem in
Lebanon, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 316-17; a press release regarding the Mghan Conflict on 20
May 1984, 1985 id. 239-40; and a press release (no. 1705) regarding the escalation of fighting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina on 10 April 1992.
The ICRC Guidelines provide:

Special rule: The ICRC does not as a rule express any views on the use of arms or
methods of warfare. It may, however, take steps and, if need be, make a public
statement ifit considers that the use or the threat to make use of a weapon or method
of warfare gives rise to an exceptionally grave situation.
Such situations arose during the course ofthe Iran-Iraq War. ICRC, Annual Report 1984, at 60-61
(7 March 1984 report on the use of prohibited weapons, and 7 June 1984 press release on the
bombing ofIraqi and Iranian cities); 1987 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 217 (appeal of 11 Feb. 1987
regarding bombing of cities); ICRC Bull., April 1988, at 4 (10 March 1988 press release protesting
against bombing ofcities, and 23 March 1988 press release condemning use ofchemical weapons in
the province ofSulaymaniyah).
For the appeals and notes verbale issued by the ICRC to the parties to the Persian Gulf Conflict, see
1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 444,1991 id. 22-30 and 211-14.
The ICRC Guidelines continue:

2. Reception and transmission of complaints
Legal basis: In conformity with article 6(4) of the Statutes of the International Red
Cross, the ICRC is entided to take cognizance of "complaints regarding alleged
breaches of the humanitarian Conventions".
(continued...)
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34.(... continued)
Complaints from a party to a ronfiict orfrom the National Sodety ofa party to a ronfiict: The
ICRC shall not transmit to a party to a conflict (or to its National Red Cross or Red
Crescent Society) the complaints raised by another party to that conflict (or by its
National Society) unless there is no other means of communication and,
consequently, a neutral intermediary is required between them.

Complaints from third parties: Complaints from third parties (govemments, National
Societies, govemmental or nongovernmental organizations, individual persons) shall
not be transmitted.
If the ICRC has already taken action concerning a complaint it shall inform the
complainant inasmuch as it is possible to do so. Ifno action has been taken, the ICRC
may take the complaint into consideration in its subsequent steps, provided that the
violation has been recorded by its delegates or is common knowledge, and insofar as
it is advisable in the interest of the victims.
The authors of such complaints may be invited to submit them directly to the
parties in conflict.

Publidty given to romplaints received: As a general rule the ICRC does not make public
the complaints it receives. It may publicly confirm the receipt of a complaint if it
concerns events of common knowledge and, ifit deems it useful, it may restate its
policy on the subject.
3. Requests for inquiries
The ICRC can only take part in an inquiry procedure if so required under the
terms of a treaty or of an ad hoc agreement by all the parties concerned. It never sets
itself up, however, as a commission of inquiry and limits itself to selecting, from
outside the institution, persons qualified to take part in such a commission.
The ICRC shall moreover not take part in an inquiry procedure ifthe procedure does not
offer a full guarantee ofirnpartiality and does not provide the parties with means to defend
their case. The ICRC must also receive an assurance that no public communications on an
inquiry request or on the inquiry itselfshall be made without its consent.

As a rule, the ICRC shall only take part in the setting up of a commission of
inquiry, under the above-stated conditions, if the inquiry is concerned with
infringements of the Geneva Conventions or of their 1977 Protocols. It shall on no
account participate in the organization of a commission if to do so would hinder or
prevent it from carrying out its traditional activities for the victims ofarmed conflicts,
or if there is a risk ofjeopardizing its reputation of impartiality and neutrality....

4. Requests to record violations
If the ICRC is asked to record the result of a violation of international
humanitarian law, it shall only do so ifit considers that the presence ofits delegates
will facilitate the discharge of its humanitarian tasks, especially if it is necessary to
assess victims' requirements in order to be able to help them. Moreover, the ICRC
shall only send a delegation to the scene ofthe violation ifit has received an assurance
that its presence will not be used to political ends.
These guidelines do not deal with violations of intemational law or humanitarian
ptinciples to the detriment ofdetainees whom they have to visit as part ofthe activities
which the ICRC's mandate requires it to carry out in the event ofinternal disturbances
or tensions within a given State. Since this type ofactivity is based on ad hoc agreements
with governments, the ICRC follows specific guidelines in such situations.
(continued ...)
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justified as a response to the unlawful acts of an enemy.35 The sole purpose of a
reprisal is to induce the enemy to cease its illegal activity and to comply with the
law of armed conflict. Reprisals may be taken against enemy armed forces,
enemy civilians other than those in occupied territory, and enemy property.36

6.2.3.1 Requirements for Reprisal. To be valid, a reprisal action must
conform to the following criteria:
34.(...continued)
1981 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 81-83. See also ICRC Protection and Assistance Activities in Situations
Not Covered by International Humanitarian Law, 1988 id. 9-37.
35. Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 33 (1971). McDougal and Feliciano have defined reprisal
during armed conflict as follows:
Legitimate war reprisals refer to acts directed against the enemy which are conceded
to be generally unlawful, but which constitute an authorized reaction to prior
unlawful acts ofther.enemy for the purpose of deterring repetition ofsuch antecedent
acts. The doctrine of reprisal thus permits the use of otherwise lawless violence as a
response to the lawless violence.
McDougal & Feliciano 679-80.
36. Reprisals may lawfully be taken against enemy individuals who have not yet fallen into the
hands of the forces making the repnsals. Under customary international law, members of the
enemy civilian population are legitimate objects of reprisals. The United States nonetheless considers
reprisal actions against civilians not otherwise legitimate objects of attack to be inappropriate in most
circumstances. For nations party to GP I, enemy civilians and the enemy civilian population are
prohibited objects of reprisal. The United States has found this new prohibition to be militarily
unacceptable because renunciation of the option of such attacks "removes a significant deterrent that
presendy protects civilians and other war victims on all sides ofa conflict." Sofaer, Remarks, paragraph
6.2, note 18 (p. 329) at 469. For a contrary view, see Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons, in Robertson
at 306. See paragraph 6.2.3.2 (p. 340) for a further discussion ofinununity from reprisals.
Collective loss of rights for residents of occupied territory is clearly prohibited by art. 33 of GC.
Internment and assigned residence, whether in the occupying power's natural territory or in
occupied territory, are" exceptional" measures to be taken only after careful consideration of each
individual case. These strict limitations are a direct reaction to the abuses which occurred during
World Wars I and II. See 4 Pictet 256-58. See also Terry, State Terrorism: AJuridical Examination
in Terms of Existing International Law, 10 J. Pal. Studies 94 (1980) for a thorough discussion of
illegal collective measures in occupied territory.
Paragraph 6.2.3 deals only with reprisals taken by one belligerent in response to illegal acts of
warfare performed by the armed forces of an enemy. Paragraph 6.2.3 does not deal with the
collective measures an occupying power may take against the population of an occupied territory
in response to illegitimate acts of hostility conunitted by the civilian population. Art. 50 ofHR
provided that no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, may be inflicted upon the population of
occupied territory on account of acts of individuals "for which they cannot be regarded as joindy
and severally responsible," and contemplated that bonafide fines, in a reasonable amount, intended
to insure respect for the rules and decrees in force, were lawful (Levie, 2 The Code of
International Armed Conflict 743). GC, art. 33(1) provides that penal liability is personal:
No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally
conunitted. Collective penalties ... are prohibited.
(continued ...)
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1. Reprisal must be ordered by an authorized representative of the belligerent
37
government. (For the rule applicable to the United States, see paragraph 6.2.3.3).

2. It must respond to illegal acts of warfare conunitted by an adversary
government, its military commanders, or combatants for which the adversary is
. al IS
. not auth onze.
. d 38
respoosl'ble. An"ttclpatory repns
3. When circumstances permit, re~risal must be preceded by a demand for redress
by the enemy of its unlawful acts. 9

4. Its purpose must be to cause the enemy to cease its unlawful activity. Therefore,
acts taken in reprisal should be brought to the attention of the enemy in order to
. al must never b e taken lor
r.
.
achi eve maxunum
effc'
eCtlveness. 40 R epns
revenge. 41
5. Reprisal must only be used as a last resort when other enforcement measures
42
have failed or would be of no avail.
6. Each reprisal must be proportional to the original violation.

43

36.(... continued)
Although the collective measures taken by an occupying power against the population of an
occupied territory are frequendy referred to as "reprisals," they should be clearly distinguished
from reprisals between belligerents dealt with here. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that
GC arts. 4 & 33(3) prohibit reprisals against civilians in occupied territory. Thus, those acts
permitted cannot amount to penal punishments or reprisals. See also Lowe, The Commander's
Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations and the Contemporary Law ofthe Sea, in Robertson
at 133-34.
37. See AFP 110-31, para. 10-7c(8). See also paragraph 6.2.3.3 (p. 341).
38. A careful inquiry by the injured belligerent into the alleged violating conduct should
precede the authorization of any reprisal measure. This is subject to the important qualification
that, in certain circumstances, an offended belligerent is justified in taking immediate reprisals
against illegal acts of warfare, particularly in those situations where the safety ofhis armed forces
would clearly be endangered by a continuance of the enemy's illegal acts. See paragraph 6.2.3.3
(p. 341) regarding authority to order reprisals.
39. There must be reasonable notice that reprisals will be taken. Green, The Contemporary
Law of Armed Conflict (1993) at 119. The degree of notice required will depend upon the
particular circumstances ofeach case. Notice is nonnally given after the enemy's violation but may,
in appropriate circumstances, predate an imminent violation. An example of notice is an appeal to
the transgressor to cease its offending conduct and punish those responsible. Such an appeal may
serve both as a plea for compliance and a notice to the adversary that reprisals will be taken
otherwise. See also FM 27-10, para. 497b.
40. Acts taken in reprisal may also be brought to the attention ofneutrals ifnecessary to achieve
maximum effectiveness. Since reprisals are undertaken to induce an adversary's compliance with
the recognized rules ofanned conflict, any action taken as a reprisal must be armounced as a reprisal
and publicized so that the adversary is aware ofits obligation to abide by the law and to ensure that
the reprisal action is not, itself, viewed as an unlawful act. See McDougal & Feliciano 689 and AFP
110-31, para. 10-7c.
41. FM 27-10, para. 497d.
42. ld., para. 497b.
43. This rule is not one of strict equivalence because the reprisal will usually be somewhat
(continued ...)
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7. A reprisal action must cease as soon as the enemy is induced to desist from its
unlawful activities and to comply with the law of armed conflict.

44

6.2.3.2 Immunity From Reprisal. Reprisals are forbidden to be taken against:
·
.
d CIV
. ili· ans46
1 . P nsoners
0 f war45 and Interne
2. Wounded, sick, and shipwrecked persons47
3. Civilians in occupied territory48
4. Hospitals and medical facilities, personnel,49 and equipment, including hospital
50
ships, medical aircraft, and medical vehicles.
43.( ...continued)
greater than the initial violation that gave rise to it. However, care must be taken that the extent of
the reprisal is measured by some degree ofproportionality and not solely by effectiveness. Effective
but disproportionate reprisals cannot be justified by the argument that only an excessive response
will forestall a further transgression. Compare McDougal & Feliciano 682-83.
The acts resorted to by way of reprisal need not conform in kind to those complained of by the
injured belligerent. The reprisal action taken may be quite different from the original act which
justified it, but should not be excessive or exceed the degree of harm required to deter the enemy
from continuance of his initial unlawful conduct. McDougal & Feliciano 682.
If an act is a lawful reprisal, it cannot lawfully be a basis for a counter-reprisal. Under international
law, there can be no reprisal against a lawful reprisal.
44. When, for example, one party to an armed conflict commits a breach oflaw but follows
that violation with an expression of regret and promise that it will not be repeated, then any action
taken by another party to "right" the situation cannot be justified as a law/hl reprisal.
45. GPW, art. 13(3); GPW 1929, art. 2(3). Prisoners of war are defined in GPW, art. 4A; see
paragraph 11.7 (p. 489). In light of the wide acceptance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions by the
nations of the world today, this prohibition is part of customary law. Meron, The Geneva
Conventions as Customaty Law, 81 Am.]. Int'l L. 348 (1987); Meron, Human Rights and
Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989). Compare NWIP 10-2, para. 31Oe(1) n.8 ("War
crimes tribunals have considered the rule forbiclding reprisals against prisoners of war as a
codification of existing customaty law. Hence, this prohibition may be regarded as binding upon
all States regardless of whether or not they are parties to the 1949 Convention.") with Levie,
Prisoners of War 366-69 (describing contrary State practice duting both World Wars and the
Korean and Vietnam conflicts). The taking of prisoners by way of reprisal for acts previously
committed (so-called "reprisal prisoners") is likewise forbidden.
46. GC, art. 33(3); see also paragraph 11.8 (p. 495).
47. GWS, art. 46, GWS-Sea, art. 47, as defined in GPW, art. 4A.
48. GC, art. 33, as defined in GC, art. 4. Also immune from reprisals under the Geneva
Conventions are the property ofsuch inhabitants, enemy civilians in a belligerent's own territory,
and the property of such civilians. GC, art. 33, as defined in GC, art. 4.
Civilians not protected from reprisal under these provisions are nationals of a nation not bound by
the GC, nationals of a neutral nation in the territory of a belligerent, and nationals of a
cobelligerent so long as their nation has normal diplomatic relations with the nation in whose
territory they are. These exceptions are eliminated under GP I for nations bound thereby.
49. GWS, art. 46, GWS Sea, art. 47. Medical personnel are defined in GWS, arts. 24-26 and
GWS-Sea, art. 36. See paragraph 11.5 (p. 486). Chaplains attached to the armed forces (GWS, art.
(continued...)
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The President alone may authorize

the taking of a reprisal action by U.S. forces. 51 Although reprisal is lawful when
the foregoing requirements are met, there is always the risk that it

will

trigger

retaliatory escalation (counter-reprisals) by the enemy.52 The United States has
historically been reluctant to resort to reprisal for just this reason.
49.(... continued)
46, GWS-Sea, art. 47) as set forth in GWS, art. 24 and GWS-Sea, art. 36, are also immune from
reprisal. See also Green, Essays on the Modem Law of War (1985) at chap VI.
50. Fixed establishments and mobile medical units ofthe medical service, hospital ships, coastal
rescue craft and their installations, medical transports, and medical aircraft are immune from reprisal
under GWS, art. 46, GWS-Sea, art. 47, as set forth in GWS, arts. 19,20,35 & 36; GWS-Sea, arts.
22, 24, 25, 27 & 39.

McDougaland Feliciano, in cornmenting on the question ofumnunityfiomreprisal, axgue that
The cumulative effect of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is that all enemy persons
who find themselves within a belligerent's effective control are immunized as targets
of reprisal. Practically the only enemy persons who may be lawfully subjected to
reprisals are those on the high seas and in the enemy's own teritory.
McDougal & Feliciano 684.
51. See also paragraph 6.2.3.1 (p. 338).
52. McDougal & Feliciano 689. Other £actors which governments will usually consider before
taking reprisals include the following:

1. Reprisals may have an adverse influence on the attitudes of governments not
participating in an armed conflict.
2. Reprisals may only strengthen enemy morale and underground resistance.
3. Reprisals may only lead to counter-reprisals by an enemy, in which case the
enemy's ability to retaliate effectively is an important factor.
4. Reprisals may render enemy resources less able to contribute to the
rehabilitation of an area after the cessation of hostilities.
5. The threat of reprisals may be more effective than their actual use.
6. Reprisals, to be effective, should be carried out speedily and should be kept
under control. They may be ineffective if random, excessive, or prolonged.
7. In any event, the decision to employ reprisals will generally be reached as a
matter of strategic policy. The immediate advantage sought must be weighed
against the possible long-range military and political consequences.
AFP 110-31, para. 10-7d, citing NWIP 10-2, ch. 3, n. 6.
Many attempted uses of reprisals in past conflicts have been unjustified either because the reprisals
were not undertaken to deter violations by an adversary or were disproportionate to the preceding
unlawful conduct. In addition to the legal requirements which regulate resort to reprisals, there are
various practical £actors which governments will consider before taking reprisals. For example,
when appeal to the enemy for redress has failed, it may be a matter of policy to consider before
resorting to reprisals, whether the opposing forces are not more likely to be influenced by a steady
adherence to the law of armed conflict. The relative importance of these political and practical
factors depends upon the degree and kind of armed conflict, the character of the adversary and its
resources, and the importance ofnations not participating in hostilities. See Colbert, Retaliation in
(continued ... )
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6.2.4 Reciprocity. Some obligations under the law of armed conflict are
reciprocal in that they are binding on the parties only so long as both sides
continue to comply with them. 53 A major violation by one side will release the
other side from all further duty to abide by that obligation. The concept of
52.( ...continued)
International Law (1948); 10 Whiteman 317-39; Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals (1971); and
Greenwood, Reprisals and Reciprocity in the New Law of Armed Conflict, in Armed Conflict
and the New Law (Meyer ed. 1989) at 227 for thorough discussions of reprisals.
The following activities, otherwise prohibited under the law of armed conflict, are among those
which may lawfully be taken in reprisal:

1. Restricted means and methods of warfare set forth in the Hague Conventions of1907
and, for parties thereto, in GP I, unless specifically prohibited as a means of reprisal. Among the
otherwise unlawful means and methods of warfare that may be employed as reprisal are:
a. employing poison or poisoned weapons;
b. killing, wounding or capturing treacherously or perfidiously individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army, such as by feigning incapacitation
by wounds or sickness or of civilian noncombatant status;
c. killing or wounding an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or
having no longer a means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;
d. declaring that no quarter will be given;
e. employing weapons, projectiles, or material or methods of warfare of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;
£ making improper use ofa flag ofrruce, of the national, or neutral flag or of

the military insignia and uniform of the enemy as well as the distinctive
badges of the Geneva Conventions;
g. use of unanchored submarine contact mines or mines and torpedoes
which do not render themselves harmless within one hour after they have
broken loose from their moorings or have been fired.
2. Military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques prohibited by
the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention.
3. For nations party thereto, the use of weapons the primary effect ofwhich is to injure by
fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays, in violation of Protocol I to the
1980 Conventional Weapons Convention.
4. For nations party thereto, the use ofmines, booby traps and other devices, in violation of
Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Convention.
5. For nations party thereto (not including the United States), the use of incendiary
weapons in a manner which violates Protocol III to the Conventional Weapons Convention.
For a discussion ofU .S. objections to new restrictions on reprisal set forth in GP I, see paragraph
6.2.3, note 36 (p. 338). Compare Hampson, Belligerent Reprisals and the 1977 Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 37 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 818 (1988). See also Aldrich, Compliance
with International Huarnnitarian Law, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 294, 301-03, who examines the
need for States contemplating ratification ofGP I, with and without accepting the competence of
the Fact Finding Commission, to reserve one or more of the provisions on reprisals.
53. Most rruces and armistices are of this nature.
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reciprocity is not applicable to humanitarian rules oflaw that protect the victims
of anned conflict, that is, those persons protected by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. 54 The decision to consider the United States released from a
particular obligation following a major violation by the enemy will be made by the
NCA.

6.2.5 War Crimes Under International Law. For the purposes of this
publication, war crimes are defined as those acts which violate the law of anned
conflict, that is, the rules established by customary and conventional
international law regulating the conduct of warfare, and which have been
generally recognized as war crimes. Acts constituting war crimes may be
committed by the anned forces ofa belligerent or by individuals belonging to the
civilian population. 55 Belligerents have the obligation under international law to
54. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(5) reprinted in 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 679
(1969); de Preux, The Geneva Conventions and Reciprocity, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 25 (those
portions ofGP I & II supplementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions are also not subject to the
principle of reciprocity).
55. War crimes, as defined in paragraph 6.2.5, are distinguished from "crimes against peace"
and "crimes against humanity." This distinction may be seen from art. 6 of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, which defined the Tribunal's jurisdiction as
follows:
The following acts, or any one of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility [see paragraph 6.1.4
(p.328)]:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war
ofaggression, or a war in violation ofinternational treaties, agreements or assurances,
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
the foregoing;

(b) Waraimes: namely, violations ofthe laws or customs ofwar. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill treatment, or deportation to slave labor or
for any other purpose, ofcivilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in
execution oforin connection with any crime within the jurisdiction ofthe Tribunal,
whether or not in violation ofthe domestic law ofthe country where perpetuated.
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1944-45, at 254 (1946); AFP 110-20, at
3-183.
Although the distinction between crimes against peace and war crimes is readily apparent, there is a
certain difficulty in distinguishing war crimes from crimes against humanity. The precise scope of
those acts included within the category of crimes against humanity is not entirely clear from the
(continued...)
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55.(... continued)
definition given in art. 6 of the Charter of The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. A
survey of the judgments of the various tribunals which tried individuals for crimes against
humanity committed during W orId War II may be summarized in the following manner:
1. Certain acts constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity and may be
tried under either charge.
2. Generally, crimes against humanity are offenses against the human rights of
individuals, carried on in a widespread and systematic manner. Thus, isolated
offenses have not been considered as crimes against humanity, and courts have
usually insisted upon proof that the acts alleged to be crimes against humanity
resulted from systematic governmental action.
3. The possible victims of crimes against humanity constitute a wider class than
those who are capable of being made the objects ofwar crimes and may include the
nationals of the State committing the offense as well as stateless persons.
4. Acts constituting crimes against humanity must be committed in execution of, or
in connection with, crimes against peace, or war crimes.

See Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L (1946) 178; Dinstein, Crimes Against
Humanity, in Theory ofInternational Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century (Makarczyk ed.
1996); Levie, Violation of Human Rights as War Crimes, 1995 Isr. Y.B. Human Rights 119.
On 21 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 177(11)
affirming "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal" and directing the International Law Commission of
the United Nations to:
(a) Formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremburg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, and

(b) Prepare a draft code ofoffenses against the peace and security ofmankind ....
The text ofthe principles formulated by the United Nations International Law Commission, with
a commentary, is reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second
Session, General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session, Supp. No. 12 (A/1316), Pt. III, pp.
11-14 (1950); Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, at 374-80; and Schindler &
Toman 923-24. That text reads as follows:
Principle I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under
international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
Principle II. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who
committed the act from responsibility under international law.
Principle III. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
Principle IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order ofhis Government or ofa
superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a
moral choice was in fact possible to him.
Principle V. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right
to a fair trial on the facts and law.
(continued ...)
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55.(...continued)
Principle VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law: [Here follow substantially similar definitions of crimes against peace,
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as are given in art. 6 of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, quoted at the beginning ofthis note.]
Principle VII. Complicity in the commission ofa crime against peace, a war crime, or
a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international
law.
For a discussion of difficulties in punishing war crimes committed in non-international armed
conflicts, see Plattner, The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 409. See also Meron,
International Criminalization ofIntemalAtrocities, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 554 (1995); Bothe, War Crimes
in Non-International Conflicts in War Crimes in International Law (Dinstein & Tabory eds. 1996) at
293-306. For a comprehensive and chilling analysis of crimes against humanity committed by
governments against their own populations, see Rummel, Death by Government (1994).
The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, established in 1993 pursuant to U.N.S.C. Resolution
829 (see paragraph 6.1.3, note 13 (p. 327», was empowered to prosecute persons for:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949;
Violations of the laws or customs of war;
Genocide; and
Crimes against humanity.

In contrast, and reflecting the differing factual and legal setting between the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia and that in Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established in
1994 pursuant to U.N .S.C. Resolution 955 (see paragraph 6.1.3, note 13 (p. 327», was empowered
to prosecute persons for:
a. Genocide
b. Crimes against humanity
c. Violations of common article 3 and of GP II
Crimes against humanity are identically defined in art. 5 of the Statute for the International Tribunal
for Yugoslavia and in art. 3 of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as:
... the following crimes committed in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
The inclusion of rape on this listing of crimes against humanity represents a departure from
Nuremberg where rape was neither mentioned in the Nuremberg Charter nor prosecuted as a war
crime. However, GC, art. 27, provides that:
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape... .
(continued...)
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punish their own nationals, whether members of the armed forces or civilians,
who commit war crimes. 56 International law also provides that belligerents have
the right to punish enemy armed forces personnel and enemy civilians who fall
under their control for such offenses. 57
55.(... continued)
The United States considers that GC, art. 27, and comparable provisions ofGPW (arts. 13 & 14),
establish rape as a war crime. See Meron, Comment: Rape as a Crime Under International
Humanitarian Law, 87 Am.]. Int'l L. 425 (1993).
Genocide is defined in both Statutes (Yugoslavia, art. 4; Rwanda, art. 2) as:
... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;
This definition is identical to that set forth in art. II of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Paris, 12January 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in 11
Whiteman 849 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Genocide Convention entered into
force for the U.S. on 23 February 1989. The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. 100-606 ofNov. 41988, with commentary, is reprinted in28 Int'ILeg. Mat'Is 754 (1989). It
is important to note that genocide "whether committed in time ofpeace or in time ofwar is a crime
under international law." (Genocide Convention, art. I).
56. The most recent action of the United States with respect to this obligation occurred on 21
August 1996 when President Clinton signed into law the War Crimes Act of1996. Pub. L. 104-192,
110 Stat. 2184, 18 U.S.c. 2401 reprinted in 35 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is 1539 (1996). The Act provides:
2401. War Crimes
(a) OFFENSE.-Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a grave
breach ofthe Geneva Conventions, in any ofthe circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be
fined under this tide or imprisoned for life or any term ofyears, or both, and if death results to the
victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.
(b) CIRCUMSTANCES.-The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the
person committing such breach or the victim ofsuch breach is a member of the Armed Forces of
the United States ora national of the United States (as deined in section 101 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act).
(c) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section, the term 'grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions' means conduct defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions
relating to the laws of warfare signed at Geneva 12 August 1949 or any protocol to any such
convention, to which the United States is a party.
For a comprehensive discussion of military jurisdiction over war crimes committed by foreign
nations see Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who
Commit International Crimes, 153 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (Summer 1996).
57. With respect to "grave breaches" (see following note), parties to the Geneva Conventions
of1949 are obliged to search out, bring to trial and to punish all persons, regardless of nationality,
who have committed or ordered to be committed, a grave breach of the Conventions. GWS, art.
49(2); GWS-Sea, art. 50(2); GPW, art. 129(2); GC, art. 146(2). See Flores, Repression ofBreaches
of the Law of War Committed by Individuals, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 247.
(continued ...)
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..
58
The fc0 11oWing acts are representattve war cnmes:
1. Offenses against prisoners ofwar, including killing withoutjust cause; torture or
inhumane treatment; subjection to public insult or curiosity; unhealthy,
57.(... continued}
The cases of misconduct by u.s. combatants in Vietnam are analyzed through examination of
court-martial convictions in Parks, Crimes in Hostilities, Marine Corps Gazette, Aug. 1976, at
16-22 & Sep. 1976, at 33-39.
58. While any violation of the law of armed conflict is a war crime, certain crimes are defined
as "grave breaches" by GWS, art. 50; GWS-Sea, art. 51; GPW, art. 130; GC, art. 147 ifcomrnitted
against persons or property protected by the Conventions. They include:
1. Willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment of protected persons;
2. Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health ofprotected
persons;
3. Taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation ofproperty not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
4. Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of:( protected
person;
5. Compelling a prisoner ofwar or other protected person to serve in the forces ofa
hostile power; and,
6. Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of
tair and regular trial prescribed in the Geneva Conventions.
GP I, arts. 11(4) & 85(2-4}, codify in greater detail the two separate categories of grave breaches.
The first category relates to combat activities and medical experimentation and provides for the
first time a meaningful standard by which such acts can be judged. A breach within this category
requires (1) willfulness and (2) that death or serious injury to body or health be caused (art. 85(3».
GP I provides that the following acts constitute grave breaches:
1. Making the civilivan population or individual civilians the object of attack;
2. Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause extensive loss oflife, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects, as defined in article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii};
3. Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces
in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss oflife, injury to civilians
or damage to civilian objects, as defined in article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii};
4. Making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
5. Making a person the object ofattack in the knowledge that he is hOTS de combat;
6. The perfidious use, in violation of~rtiC1e 37, ofthe distinctive emblem ofthe red
cross, red crescent, or other protective sign recognized by the Conventions or this
Protocol;
7. Physical multilations;
8. Medical or scientific experiments; and,
(continued ...)
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dangerous, or otherwise prohibited labor; infringement of religious rights; and
59
denial of fair trial for offenses

58.(... continued)
9. Removal of tissue or organs for transplantation, except where these acts are
justified in conformity with the state of health of the person or consistent with
medical practice or conditions provided for in the Conventions.
(a) Exceptions may be made only in the case of donations of blood for
transfusion or of skin for grafting, provided that they are given voluntarily
and without any coercion or inducement, and then only for therapeutic
purposes, under conditions consistent with generally accepted medical
standards and controls designed for the benefit of both the donor and the
recipient.

(b) Any willful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or
mental health or integrity ofany person who is in the power ofa Party other
than the one on which he depends and which either violates any of the
prohibitions above or fails to comply with these requirements is a grave
breach of Protocol I.
The second category ofgrave breaches defined by GP I is in art. 85(4). The only requirement to be
satisfied with respect to these offenses is willfulness.
1. The transfer by the occupying power ofparts ofits own civilian population into
the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the
population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory, in violation of
article 49 of the [GC];
2. Unjustified delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
3. Practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving
outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;
4. Making the clearly recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage ofpeoples and to which
special protection has been given by special arrangement, for example, within the
framework ofa competent international organization, the object ofattack, causing
as a result extensive destruction thereof, where there is no evidence ofthe violation
by the adverse Party of article 53, subparagraph (b), and when such historic
monuments, works of art and places or worship are not located in the immediate
proximity of military objectives, and,
5. Depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in paragraph 2
of Article 85 of fair and regular trial.

See also Levie, 2 The Code ofIntemational Armed Conflict 857-71; Burgos, The Taking of
Hostages and International Humanitarian Law, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 196; and International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, New York, December 17,1979, 1316 U.N.T.S.
205, T.I.A.S. 11081.
59. Principle VI (b) , 1950 Nuremberg Principles (see note 55 (p. 343»; GPW, arts. 13, 17(4),
34-37,52,84, 87(3), 105 & 130; GP I, art. 75(2)(a).
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2. Offenses against civilian inhabitants of occupied territory, including killing
without just cause, torture or inhumane treatment, forced labor{, deportation,
infringement of religious rights, and denial of fair trial for offenses 0
3. Offenses against the sick and wounded, including killing, wounding, or
61
mistreating enemy forces disabled by sickness or wounds
4. Denial of quarter (i.e., killing or wounding an enemy hOTS de combat or making a
genuine offer of surrender) and offenses against combatants who have laid down
62
their arms and surrendered
5. Offenses against the survivors of ships and aircraft lost at sea, including killing,
wounding, or mistreating the shipwreckedi and failing to provide for the safety of
survivors as military circumstances permit 3
60. Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles; GC, arts. 27(1), 31-32, 49(6), 95(3), 100,
118(1) & 147; GP I, art. 75 (2) (a); GP II, art. 4(2)(a).
61. Lieber Code, art. 71; HR, art. 23(c); GWS, arts. 12(2) & 50; GP I, arts. 10,41 & 85(3); GP
II, arts. 4(1) & 7(1).
62. HR, arts. 23(c) & 23(d); GP I, art. 40; GP II, art. 4(1); Trial of Von Ruchtesdlell, 9 :tR.:r'WC
82 (British military court, Hamburg, 1947) (denial ofquarter at sea). See paragraph 11.9.5 (p. 499)
regarding use of the white flag.
63. Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles; GWS-Sea, arts. 12(2) & 51. This rule was
applied in the 1921 case of the llandovery Castle, 16 Am.]. Int'l L. 708 (1922); and in a number of
World War II cases, including TIle PELEUS Trial, 1 LRTWC 1 (British Military Court, Hamburg,
1945), TIle Trial ofMoehle, 9 LRTWC 75 (British Military Court, Hamburg, 1946) and in the Trial of
Helmuth Von Rudltesdlell, 9 LRTWC 92 (1949). The PELEUS and Von Ruchteschell cases are
summarized in Mallison 133-43 and in Jacobsen, A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on the
U.S.S. Liberty, 36 Nav. L. Rev. 48 & 50 (1986).Jacobsen 45-51 argues the Israelimachinegunningof
liferafts on board and thrown from USS LIBERTY, after the attack on the LIBERTY was
completed, f.ills within this prohibition. See paragraph 11.4 (p. 484). There was no prosecution of
U.S. and Australian forces for the systematic killing of the Japanese survivoxs of the March 1943,
Battle of the Bismark Sea, who were in lifeboats or clinging to wreckage. See 6 Morison, History of
the United States Naval Operations in World War II, 62 etseq. (1950); Spector, Eagle Against the Sun
227-28 (1985); Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War 67 (1986). Indeed
the Commanding Officer of USS WAHOO was awarded the Navy Cross and an Army
Distinguished Service Cross following his January 1943 patrol notwithstanding his slaughter of the
survivoxs ofWAHOO's torpedoing ofa convoy oftwo freightexs and a large transport. 2 Blair, Silent
Victory 357-60 (1975); Dower 66-67 & n.94. Blair notes that, although the Commanding Officer
[D]escribed the killing ofthe hundreds (or thousands) ofsurvivoxs ofthe transport ...
no queston was raised about it in the glowing patrol report endoxsements, where
policy was usually set forth. Many submarinexs interpreted this-and the honoxs and
publicity showered on [Captain] Morton and Wahoo---as tacit approval from the
submarine high command. In fact, neither Lockwood [Commander Submarine
Force Pacific] nor Christie [Commander Task Force 51] nor Fife [Commander Task
Force 42] ever issued a policy statement on the subject. Whether other skippexs
should follow Morton's example was left up to the individual. Few did.
Blair 359-60. The following language ofGWS-Sea, art. 12, makes clear that since the coming into
force of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, such acts are unlawful:
(continued...)
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6. Wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages or devastation not justified by
the requirements of military operations; and bombardment, the sole purpose of
which is to attack and terrorize the civilian population64

7. Deliberate attack upon medical facilities, hospital ships, medical aircraft, medical
65
vehicles, or medical personnel

8. Plunder and pillage of public or private property66
9. Mutilation or other mistreatment of the dead

67

10. Employing forbidden arms or ammunition68
11. Misuse, abuse, or firing on flags of truce or on the Red Cross device, and
· ar protectIve
. embl ems, SIgnS,
.
simil
and'
SIgnals69
12. Treacherous re~uest for quarter (i.e., feigning surrender in order to gain a
military advantage). 0

6.2.5.1 Trials During Hostilities. Although penrutted under international
law, nations rarely try enemy combatants while hostilities are in progress. 71 Such
63.(... continued)
Article 12
Members of the anned forces ... who are at sea and who are .... shipwrecked, shall
be respected and protected in all circumstances, it being understood that the tenn
"shipwreck" means shipwreck from any cause ....
See Doswald-Beck at 136.
64. HR, arts. 23(g) & 25; Hague IX, art. 1(1); Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles;
GP I, art. 51(2); GP II, art. 13(2).
65. GWS, arts. 19(1),20 & 36(1); GWS-Sea, arts. 22-27 & 39(1); GC, arts. 18(1),21,22(1);
GP I, arts. 12 & 22; GP II, art. 11; Uandovery Castle Case oj Ditlzmar and Boldt, Gennan
Reichgericht, 16 July 1921, 16 Am. J. Int'l L. 708 (1922).
66. HR, arts. 28, 47 & 56; Hague IX, art. 7; Principle VI(b), 1950 Nuremberg Principles;
GWS, art. 15(1); GWS-Sea, art. 18(1); GC, arts. 16(2) & 33(2); GP II, arts. 4(2)(g) & 8.
67. GWS, art. 15(1); GWS-SEA, art. 18(1); GC, art. 16(2); GP I, art. 34(1); GP II, art. 8.
68. HR, arts. 23(a) & 23(e); GP I, art. 35(2).
69. HR, arts. 23(f) & 32-34; 1923 Radio Rules, art. 10 (reprinted in 32Am.J. Int'lL. Supp!. 10,
(1938»; Levie, 2 The Code ofIntemationalAnned Conflict 871 (distress signals); GP I, arts. 37(1),
38(1) & 85(3)(f); GWS, arts. 53 & 54; GWS-Sea, arts. 43 & 45; GP I, arts. 18(8),38 & 85(3)(f); Trial
oJHeinz Hagendoif, 11 LRTWC 146 (U.S. military court at Dachau, 1946). See 10 Whiteman 398
(white flag lawfully fired on during Korean War); Higginbotham, Case Studies in the Law ofLand
Warfare II: The Campaign in the Falklands, Military Rev., Oct. 1984, at 53.
70. HR, art. 23(b); GP I, art. 40.
71. Exceptions include limited Russian trials in 1943 (McDougal & Feliciano 704) and the trial
ofDoolitde's raiders inJapan (Glines, Doolitde's Raiders (1964); Schultz, The Doolitde Raid
305-17,347-48 (1988); and Spaight 58). This is not to deny that atrocities were committed against
prisoners of war, but only to suggest that this method of adjudication is not routinely employed
against lawful combatants.
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trials might provoke undesirable actions from an enemy and complicate
humanitarian protections aPt§licable to one's own nationals? Trials of unlawful
combatants have been held. Yet, for similar reasons, such trials may be less than
rigorously pursued during the course of hostilities. (Regarding trials ofa nation's
own forces, see paragraph 6.2.5.3.)
6.2.5.2 Trials After Hostilities. Even after the close of hostilities, criminal
trials against lawful enemy combatants have been the exception, not the rule?4
72. GPW art. 85 does not prohibit such trials, but does require that prisoners of war retain,
even ifconvicted, the benefits of that Convention. Many fonner Conununist nations reserved art.
85, in various fonns, e.g.:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by the
obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of the
Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the
Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of
such crimes must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the country in question
for those who undergo their punishment.
The United States explicidy rejected these reservations while accepting treaty relations with the
reserving countries as to the remaining unreserved provisions. The reservations are quoted in
Schindler & Toman 563-94. The reservations to art. 85 are analyzed in Pilloud, Reservations to the
Geneva Conventions of1949, 1976 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 170-80.
For the United States reaction to the threat by the North Viemamese Government to try U.S.
prisoners ofwar, see the 13 July 1966 memorandum of the Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of
State, reprinted in 10 Whiteman 231 and Moore, Law and The Indo-China War 635 (1972).
73. See paragraphs 6.2.5.3 (p. 353) and 12.7.1 (p. 515) and 10 Whiteman 150-95.
Historically, unlawful combatants were often not afforded the benefit oftrials although this is now
required by GWS, art. 49; GWS-Sea, art. 50; GPW, art. 129; GC, art. 146; and, for nations party
thereto, GP I, art. 75. Ex Parte Quirin, 317U.S. 1 (1942), involved the trial ofunlawful combatants
who were German soldiers smuggled into the United States via submarine who discarded their
unifonns upon entry, but were captured prior to committing acts ofsabotage (see paragraph 12.5.3
(p.513».
On historical precedents for war crime trials of adversary personnel, particularly unlawful
combatants, see Cowles, Universality ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 177, 203
(1945). He notes:
War criminals ... are especially found among irregular combatants and fonner
soldiers who have quit their posts to plunder and pillage ... such as bandits, brigands,
buccaneers, bushwackers, filibusters, franctireurs, free-booters, guerrillas, ladrones,
marauders, partisans, pirates and robbers ... Historically, brigandage has been to a
large extent international in character ... Brigandage is a thriving byproduct ofwar.
The object ... is to bring out the connection between the past and the present. .. It is
not meant to be suggested that war crimes committed by members of regularly
constituted units are any less amenable to such jurisdiction.
74. As to unlawful combatants, this was frequendy done by sununary punishment without
benefit of trial. See Cowles, Universality ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 177
(1945).
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After World War I, responsibility for initiating that conflict was formally
assigned to Kaiser Wilhelm, and an extensive report of alleged atrocities
committed by German troops was prepared by the Allies. No international trials
were held against World War I combatants. Some trials were held by German
75
authorities of German personnel as required by the Allies. Due to the gross
excesses of the Axis Powers during World War II, involving not only initiation
of aggressive war but also wholesale execution of ethnic groups and enslavement
of occupied territories, the Allied Powers determined that large scale assignment
of individual criminal responsibility was necessary. Crimes against peace and
crimes against humanity were charges against the principal political, military and
industrial leaders responsible for the initiation of the war and various inhumane
policies. The principal offenses against combatants directly related to combat
activities were the willful killing of prisoners and others in temporary custodr 76
Since World War II, such prosecutions after conflicts have not occurred. 7
75. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Gennany, Versailles,June
28, 1919, in 1 The Law ofWar 417 (Friedman ed. 1972); Commission on the Responsibility ofthe
Authors of the War and On Enforcement of Penalties, 14 Am. J. Int'!. L. 95 (1920);Judgments of
the Supreme Court at Leipzig of the [WorldWarI] German War Trials, 16Am.J. Int'IL. 674-724
(1922); Mullins, The Leipzig Trials (1921); Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law
27 (1962); Glueck, War Criminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment 19 (1944); U.N. Sec'y
Gen. Memorandum, Historical Survey of the Questions ofInternational Criminal Jurisdiction,
AfCN417 fRev.1 (1949). Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes,
21 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 58, at 84 (1944) notes that of the 901 cases heard before the Leipzig Supreme
Court in 1923-24, only 13 ended in convictions.
76. A representative sample of the literature is given:

Views on the World War II Trials: Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg (1970) (survey of views of
others); Nuremberg, German Views of the War Trials (Benton and Grimm ed. 1955); Knieriem,
The Nuremberg Trials (1959) (Gennan); Vogt, The Burden of Guilt (1964) (Gennan);
Maugham, UNO and War Crimes (1951) (English); Morgan, The Great Assize (1948) (English);
Klafkowski, The Nuremberg Principles and the Development of International Law (1966)
(Polish); Ginsberg, Laws of War and War Crimes on the Russian Front: The Soviet View, 11
Soviet Studies 253 (1960); Green, Superior Orders in National and International Law (1976);
Taylor, Nuremburg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (1970); Doenitz at Nuremberg: A
Reappraisal (Thompson & Strutz eds. 1976); Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (1983); Tusa & Tusa,
The Nuremberg Trial (1984).
On the Tokyo war crimes trials, see Minear, Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1971);
Shiroyama, War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki (1974, Bester trans!' 1977); and
Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1987). As
to Japanese atrocities during WWII generally, see Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes
in World War II (1996).

Bibliographies: Garsse, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes Trials: A Bibliography
(1951); U.S. Library of Congress, The Nazi State, War Crimes and War Criminals (1954).
Summaries of cases are found in U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals, 15 volumes (1949); Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (1954);
U.S. Gov't, Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control
(continued ...)
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6.2.5.3 Jurisdiction over Offenses. 78 Except for war crimes trials conducted
by the Allies after W orId War II, the majority ofprosecutions for violations ofthe
law ofanned conflict have been trials ofone's own forces for breaches ofmilitary
discipline. Violations of the law of anned conflict committed by persons subject
to the military law of the United States will usually constitute violations of the
Unifonn Code of Military Justice and, if so, will be prosecuted under that
Code.79
76.(... continued)
Council Law No. 10 (1946-1949) (principal U.S. trials subsequent to International Military
Tribunal); 11 Whiteman, Digest ofInternational Law 884 (1968).

Judgments: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) ,Judgment and Sentence, 41 Am.]. Int'l L.
172 (1947); International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and
Judgment (1947), excerpted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1946-1947,
at 241-307 (1948); International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment, 3 parts (1948),
excerpted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1948-1949, at 76-106 (1950).

General Literature: Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949); Appleman, Military Tribunals and International
Crimes (1954); Davidson, The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty-two Defendants
Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1966);Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi
War Criminals (1946); Jackson, The Nuremberg Case (1947); Keeshan, Justice at Nuremberg
(1946); W oetzel, The Nuremberg Trials and International Law (1962); Weingartner, Crossroads of
Death: The Story ofthe MaImedy Massacre and Trial (1979); de Zayas, The Wehrrnacht War Crimes
Bureau, 1939-1945 (1989); Levie, Terrorism in War-The Law ofWar Crimes (1992); War Crimes
in International Law (Dinstein & Tabory eds. 1996).
Vietnam: Bilton & Sim, Four Hours in My Lai (1992); Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (1979); The My
Lai Massacre and its Cover-up (Goldstein, Marshall & Schwartz, eds. 1976) (the 1970 Peers
Report); Hersh, Cover-Up (1972); McCarthy, Medina (1972); Everett, Johnson & Rosenthal,
Calley (1971).
77. As an example, see Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Civilian
Internees, para. 15, signed by Bangladesh, India and Pakistan 9 April 1974, in 13 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is
505 (1974). Despite the collection by the U.S. and other nations pursuant to U.N .S.C. Resolution
674 (1990) (see paragraph 6.2, note 20 (p. 330» of extensive evidence of Iraqi war crimes
committed during the 1990-91 Gulf War, no prosecutions ensued from that effort. See McNeill,
Panel Discussion, in Grunawalt, King & McClain at 619-20 for a brief account of political
difficulties that apparendy sidetracked that effort. However, internaitonal support of the concept of
post-conflict trials is again apparent, as evidenced by the recendy established International Tribunal
for Yugoslavia (1993) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994). See paragraph
6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343).
78. See GWS, art. 49; GWS-Sea, art. 50; GPW, art. 129; GC, art. 146. On U.S. jurisdiction
over enemy nationals, see UCMJ, art. 18, which creates jurisdiction in general courts-martial to tty
"any person" who by the law ofarmed conflict is subject to trial by a military tribunal; R.C.M. 201
(t)(l)(B), MCM, 1984; FM 27-10, para. 505d; and AFP 110-31, para 15-4a. See also Newton,
paragraph 6.2.5, note 56 (p. 346).
79. U.S. military personnel tried by court-martial for offenses that constitute war crimes are either
charged with the U.S. domestic equivalent of such offenses, e.g., murder (art. 118), rape (art. 120),
assault (art. 128), cruelty and maltreatment (art. 93); with law-of-war specific offenses, e.g., looting and
pillaging (art. 103); with conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline (art. 134); or with violation of
a lawful general order (art. 92), such as art. 0705, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1990 (see paragraph 6.1.2
(p. 324». See also Solis, Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire 32-33 (1989).
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Although jurisdiction extends to enemy personnel, trials have almost
exclusively been against unlawful combatants, such as persons who take part in
combat operations without distinguishing themselves clearly from the civilian
population during battle or those acting without state sanction for private ends. 80
In the United States, its territories and possessions, jurisdiction is not limited
to offenses against U.S. nationals, but extends to offenses against persons of other
nationalities. Violations by enemy nationals may be tried as offenses against
international law, which forms part of the law of the United States. In occupied
territories, trials are usually held under occupation law. Trials of such personnel
have been held in military courts, military commissions, provost courts, military
government courts, and other military tribunals. 81 There is no statute of
limitations on the prosecution of a war crime. 82 (On jurisdiction generally, see
paragraph 3.11.1.)

6.2.5.4 Fair Trial Standards. The law of armed conflict establishes minimum
standards for the trial of foreign nationals charged with war crimes. 83 Failure to

80. See Castrep, The Present Law of War and Neutrality 87 (1954) and Greenspan 502-511.
The United States normally punishes war crimes, including "grave breaches," as such only if they
are committed by enemy nationals or by persons serving the interests of enemy nations. Violations of
the law of anned conflict committed within the United States by other persons will usually constitute
violations of federal or state criminal law and preferably will be prosecuted under such law.
81. Although UCM], art. 21, establishes concurrent jurisdiction with general courts-martial in
military commissions, provost courts or other military tribunals for offenses that by the law of
anned conflict may be tried by such commissions or tribunals, GPW, art. 85 provides that paws
who are prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture
shall retain, even ifconvicted, the benefits ofthat Convention. One benefit ofGPW appears in art.
102 that paws can be validly sentenced only ifsuch sentences have been pronounced by the same
courts according to the same procedures as in the case of members of the anned forces of the
Detaining Power. A POW in United States custody would enjoy the same procedural safeguards
afforded to U.S. anned forces personnel under the UCM] for offenses committed whether before
or after capture. These provisions seem to preclude future use of the type of military commission
that tried General Yamashita. See McDougal & Feliciano 730-31.
82. 1977 Digest of United States Practice in International Law 927; UN Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 26
Nov. 1968, entered into force 11 Nov. 1970, not in force for the United States, 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'Is
68 (1969). While not opposed to the basic purposes of this convention, the United States voted
against its adoption because it redefined crimes against humanity in a legally unsatisfactory way and
had retroactive application in nations in which existing limits had expired. Dep't St. Bull., 17 Feb.
1969, at 153. Miller, The Convention on the Non-Applicability ofStatutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 65 Am. ]. Int'l L. 476 (1971) examines the travaux
preparatoires of this convention.
83. GPWarts. 82-108, GC, arts. 64-75 & 117-26, GP II, art. 6, and for nations party thereto
GP I, art. 75. The United States supports "in particular" the fundamental guarantees contained in
GP I, art. 75, as ones that should be observed and in due course recognized as customary law even if
they have not already achieved that status. Matheson, Remarks, paragraph 6.1, note 1 (p. 323) at 422 &
427.
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provide a fair trial for the alleged conunission of a war crime is itself a war
.
84
cnme.
---------

6.2.5.5 Defenses
6.2.5.5.1 Superior Orders. The fact that a person conunitted a war crime
under orders of his military or civilian superior does not relieve him from
responsibility under international law. It may be considered in mitigation of
punishment. 85 To establish responsibility, the person must know (or have reason
to know) that an act he is ordered to perform is unlawful under international
law. 86 Such an order must be manift"".dy illegal.87 The standard is whether under
84. GWS, art. 50; GWS-Sea, art. 51; GPW, art. 130; GC, art. 147; GP I, art. 85(4)(e) (forStates
party thereto).
85. See paragraph 6.1.4 (p. 328). The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, art. 8, stated:
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a
superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation
of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1944-45,255 (1946).
Despite efforts to include a provision on the defense of superior orders in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and in GP I, nations could not agree on the balance between military discipline and
the requirements of humanitarian law, and thus left unchanged the international law on the
defense of superior orders. Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions: Supplement (1985), provides the negotiating history of the effort to include a
provision on the defense of superior orders in GP I. See also Levie, The Rise and Fall of an
Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of Superior Orders, 30 Revue De Droit Militaire
Et De Droit De La Guerre 183 (1991), reprinted in Schmitt & Green at chap. XV. Note that the
Statute for the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the Statute for the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (see paragraph 6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343» provide (in arts. 7(4) & 6(4)
respectively) the following:
The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a
superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in
anticipation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
86. The following statement indicates those circumstances in which the plea ofsuperior orders
may serve as a defense:
Undoubtedly, a Court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in
justification ofa war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that obedience to
military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty ofevery member ofthe armed forces
and that the latter cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be expected to weigh
scrupulously the legal merits of the order received; that rules of warfare are often
controversial; and that an act otherwise amounting to a war crime may have been
executed in obedience to orders conceived as a measure ofreprisals. Such circumstances
are probably in themselves sufficient to divest the act of the stigma of a war crime.
2 Oppenheim-Lauterpact 568-69.
(continued...)
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the same or similar circumstances a person of ordinary sense and understanding
would know the order to be unlawful. 88 If the person knows the act is unlawful
and only does it under duress, this circumstance may be taken into consideration
either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment. 89
6.2.5.5.2 Military Necessity. The law of armed conflict provides that only
that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed
conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a
minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may be applied. This
principle, often referred to as "military necessity," is a fundamental concept of
86.(... continued)

As to the general attitude taken by military tribunals toward the plea of superior orders, the
following statement is representative:
It cannot be questioned that acts done in time ofwar under the military authority ofan
enemy cannot involve any criminal liability on the part of officers or soldiers ifthe acts
are not prohibited by the conventional or customary rules of war. Implicit obedience
to orders of superior officers is almost indispensable to every military system. But this
implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act done pursuant to a superior's orders
be murder, the production ofthe order will not make it any less so. It may mitigate but
it cannot justify the crime. We are of the view, however, that if the illegality of the
order was not known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been expected
to know of its illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime
exists and the interior [sic] will be protected. But the general rule is that members of the
armed forces are bound to obey only the lawful orders oftheir commanding officers and
they cannot escape criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international
law and outrages fundamental concepts ofjustice.

TI,e Hostage Case (United States v. Wilhelm Ust et al.), 11 TWC 1236.
87. See U.S. v. Calley, 46 CMR 1131, 48 CMR 19 (1969, 1971). UCM], art. 92, requires
members of the armed forces to obey only lawful orders. An order that directs the commission ofa
crime is a patendy illegal order. Para. 14c(2)(a)(i), Part IV, MCM, 1984.
88. R.C.M. 916(d); U.S. v. Calley, 48 CMR 29 (opinion of}. Quinn), 30 (concurring opinion
of]. Duncan); Green, Superior Orders in National and International Law 142 (1976). R.C.M.
916(d) provides:
Obedience to orders. It is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to
orders unless the accused knew the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary
sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.
See Green, Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man, inEmys on tbeModemlaw ofWar(l985) at chap. III.
89. An individual may plead duress if he can establish that he acted only under pain of an
immediate threat, e.g., the immediate threat of physical coercion, in the event of noncompliance
with the order of a superior. In the judgment of one tribunal, it was declared that:

[T]here must be a showing of circumstances such that a reasonable man would
apprehend that he was in such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom
to choose the right and refrain from the wrong.

TI,e High Command Case (United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al.), 11 TWC 509.
(continued...)
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restraint designed to limit the application offorce in anned conflict to that which
is in fact required to carry out a lawful military purpose. Too often it is
misunderstood and misapplied to support the application of military force that is
excessive and unlawful under the misapprehension that the "military necessity"
of mission accomplishment justifies the result. While the principle does
recognize that some amount of collateral damage and incidental injury to
civilians and civilian objects may occur in an attack upon a legitimate military
objective, it does not excuse the wanton destruction of life and progerty
disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained from the attack. 9
6.2.5.5.3 Acts Legal or Obligatory Under National Law. The fact that
national law does not prohibit an act which constitutes a war crime under
international law does not relieve the ferson who committed the act from
responsibility under internationallaw. 9 However, the fact that a war crime
under intemationallaw is made legal and even obligatory under national law may
be considered in mitigation of punishment. 92

89.(... continued)
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared in its judgment that the test of
responsibility for superior orders "is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was
in fact possible." 1 Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg 14 November 1945- 1 October 1946, at 224 (1947), excerpted in U.S. Naval War
College, International Law Documents, 1946-1947, at 260 (1948).
The following examples illustrate these principles:

Case 1: The deliberate target selection of a hospital protected under the Geneva
Conventions for aerial bombardment would be a violation of law. Although the
person making the selection would be criminally responsible, a pilot given such
coordinates would not be criminally responsible unless he knew the nature of the
protected target attacked and that circumstances (e.g., see paragraph 8.5.1.4 (p. 424))
did not otherwise justifY the attack.
Case 2: Faulty intelligence may cause attacks on targets which are not in fact military
objectives. No criminal responsibility would result in this event unless the attack was
pursued after the correct intelligence was received and communicated to the
attacking force.

Case 3. A naval pilot attacks, admittedly in a negligent manner, and consequendy
misses his target, a military objective, by several miles. The bombs fall on civilian
objects unknown to the pilot. No deliberate violation ofinternational law occurred.
However, he might be subject to possible criminal punishment under his own
nation's criminal code for dereliction of duty. He could not properly be charged
with a violation of the law of armed conflict.
90. See Stone 352; McDougal & Feliciano 72 & 528; FM 27-10, para. 3; Note, Military
Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 29 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 442 (1953); Greenspan 279; and 3 Hyde
1801. Compare paragraph 5.2, note 6 (p. 292). See also De Mulinen, Handbook on the Law War
For Armed Forces (1987) at 352-55.
91. Principle II, paragraph 6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343); FM 27-10, para. 511.
92. DA Pam 27-161-2, at 249, and sources cited therein.
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6.2.5.6 Sanctions. Under international law, any punishment, including the
death penalty, may be imposed on any person found guilty of a war crime. 93
United States policy requires that the punishment be deterrent in nature and
proportionate to the gravity of the offense. 94

93. Levie, 2 The Code ofInternational Anned Conflict 907.
94. FM 27-10, para. 508. For a recent general discussion of issues relating to war crimes trials,
defenses, and other developments regarding international tribunals, see Albany Law Review
Annual Symposium: Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in
International Law, in 60 Albany L. Rev. 565-1079 (1997).
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ANNEXA6-1
REPORTABLE VIOLATIONS
SECNAVIST 3300.1 (series), OPNAVINST 3300.52 (Navy) and MCO
3300.3 (Marine Corps), require each person in the Department of the Navy who
has knowledge ofor receives a report ofan apparent violation of the law ofanned
conflict to make that incident known to his immediate commander,
commanding officer, or to a superior officer as soon as is practicable, and requires
commanders and commanding officers receiving reports of noncompliance with
or breaches of the law of anned conflict to report the facts prompdy to the
National Military Command Center. The 1949 Geneva Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims (and the 1977 Protocol I Additional to those
Conventions for nations bound thereby) proscribe certain acts which are
commonly accepted as violations of the law of anned conflict. See paragraph
6.1.2, note 9 (p. 325) and accompanying text.
The following are examples of those incidents which must be reported:
1. Offenses against the wounded, sick, survivors of sunken ships, prisoners of
war, and civilian inhabitants of occupied or allied territories including interned
and detained civilians: attacking without due cause; willful killing; torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological, medical or scientific experiments;
physical mutilation; removal of tissue Or organs for transplantation; any medical
procedure not indicated by the health of the person and which is not consistent
with generally accepted medical standards; willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health or seriously endangering the physical or mental
health; and taking as hostages.
2. Other offenses against prisoners of war (POW): compelling a POW to
serve in the anned forces of the enemy; causing the perfonnance of unhealthy,
dangerous, or otherwise prohibited labor; infringement of religious rights; and
deprivation of the right to a fair and regular trial.
3. Other offenses against survivors of sunken ships, the wounded or sick:
when military interests do permit, failure to search out, collect, make provision
for the safety of, or to care for survivors ofsunken ships, or to care for members of
anned forces in the field who are disabled by sickness or wounds or who have laid
down their arms and surrendered.
4. Other offenses against civilian inhabitants, including interned and detained
civilians of, and refugees and stateless persons within, occupied or allied
territories: unlawful deportation or transfer, unlawful confinement, compelling
forced labor, compelling the civilian inhabitants to serve in the anned forces of
the enemy or to participate in military operations, denial of religious rights,
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denaturalization, infringement of property rights, and denial of a fair and regular
trial.
5. Attacks on individual civilians or the civilian population, or indiscriminate
attacks affecting the civilian population or civilian property, knowing that the
attacks will cause loss oflife , injury to civilians or damage to civilian property that
would be excessive or disproportionate in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated, and which cause death or serious injury to body
or health.
6. Deliberate attacks upon medical transports including hospital ships, coastal
rescue craft, and their lifeboats or small craft; medical vehicles; medical aircraft;
medical establishments including hospitals; medical units; medical personnel or
crews (including shipwrecked survivors); and persons parachuting from aircraft
in distress during their descent.
7. Killing or otherwise imposing punishment, without a fair trial, upon spies
and other persons suspected of hostile acts while such persons are in custody.
8. Maltreatment or mutilation of dead bodies.
9. Willful or wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity; aerial or naval bombardment whose sole
purpose is to attack and terrorize the civilian population, or to destroy protected
areas, buildings or objects (such as buildings used for religious, charitable or
medical purposes, historic monuments or works of art); attacking localities
which are undefended, open to occupation, and without military significance;
attacking demilitarized zones contrary to the terms establishing such zones.
10. Improper use of privileged buildings or localities for military purposes.
11. Attacks on facilities--such as dams and dikes, which, if destroyed, would
release forces dangerous to the civilian population-when not justified by
military necessity.
12. Pillage or plunder of public or private property.
13. Willful misuse of the distinctive emblem (red on a white background) of
the red cross, red crescent or other protective emblems, signs or signals
recognized under international law.
14. Feigning an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or surrender; feigning
incapacitation by wounds or sickness; feigning civilian non-combatant status;
feigning protected status by use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United
Nations or a neutral or other nation not a party to the conflict or by wearing
civilian clothing to conceal military identity during batde.
15. Firing upon a flag of truce.
16. Denial of quarter, unless bad faith is reasonably suspected.
17. Violations of surrender or armistice terms.
18. Using poisoned or otherwise forbidden arms or ammunition.
19. Poisoning wells, streams or other water sources.
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20. Other analogous acts violating the accepted rules regulating the conduct
of warfare.

Source: SECNAVINST 3300.1A (series)
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ANNEXA6-2
RULES FOR COMBATANTS
u.S. NAVY
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS
1. Fight only enemy combatants.

2. Destroy no more than your mission requires.
3. Do not attack enemy soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines who surrender.
Disarm them and tum them over to your superior.
4. Prisoners of war and other detainees shall never be tortured or killed.
5. Collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked survivors, whether
friend or enemy, on land or at sea.
6. Medical personnel and chaplains, medical and religious facilities and medical
transportation are protected. Respect them and do not attack them.
7. Treat all civilians humanely and respect their property. Do not attack them.
8. Do your best to prevent any violation of the above rules. Report any
violations to the appropriate authority promptly.
9. You cannot be ordered to violate these rules.
10. Discipline in combat is essential. Disobedience of the law of armed conflict
dishonors your nation, the Navy, and you. Far from weakening the enemy's will
to fight, such disobedience strengthens it. Disobedience of the law of armed
conflict is also a crime punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ).

Source: OPNAVINST 3300.52
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U.S. MARINE CORPS
LAW OF WAR PRINCIPLES
Discipline in combat is essential. Disobedience to the law of war dishonors the
Nation, the Marine Corps, and the individual Marine; and far from weakening
the enemy's will to fight, it strengthens it. The following principles require the
Marine's adherence in the accomplishment of any mission. Violations have an
adverse impact on public opinion both national and international and have on
occasion served to prolong conflict by inciting an opponent to continue
resistance and in most cases constitute violations of the UCMJ. Violations of
these principles prejudice the good order and discipline essential to success in
combat.
1. Marines fight only enemy combatants.
2. Marines do not harm enemies who surrender. They must disarm them and
turn them over to their superior.
3. Marines do not kill or torture prisoners.
4. Marines collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
5. Marines do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
6. Marines destroy no more than the mission requires.
7. Marines treat all civilians humanely.
8. Marines do not steal. Marines respect private property and possessions.
9. Marines should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war. They
must report all violations of the law of war to their superior.

Source: Marine Corps Institue Order P1500.44C

